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1. Introduction
Over the last three decades, a large body of literature has been dedicated to analysing the impact
of unemployment insurance (UI) systems on the labour market (Holmlund, 1998; Krueger and Meyer,
2002). While this literature has initially focused on the level and the duration of benefits, a growing
strand of more recent research has focused on eligibility conditions related to job search, such as
minimum job search requirements, monitoring and sanctioning. A common belief is that this “stick”
component can mitigate the moral hazard effect on job search caused by generous and long-lasting
UI payments (Grubb, 2001; Fredriksson and Holmlund, 2006; McVicar, 2014). For this reason most
OECD countries have tightened the enforcement of such measures since the mid-1990s (Langenbucher,
2015).
A wealth of studies has documented that search conditionality reduces the time spent on benefit,
generating large savings in welfare payments. However, although earlier exits from benefit often
correspond to transitions to jobs, several studies have found limited or no effects on employment inflows
(see Caliendo and Schmidl, 2016; McVicar, 2014; Meyer, 1995, for surveys on the evidence). Moreover,
more recent studies have pointed out some unintended consequences of search-conditionality measures,
leading to some criticism on their utility (Raffass, 2017; Cockx et al., 2014). In fact tighter conditions
can increase UI outflows to lower paid and/or more unstable jobs (see e.g. Van den Berg, Hofmann
and Uhlendorff, 2016), to other income support benefits (see e.g. Avram, Brewer and Salvatori, 2018),
to irregular jobs (Wolff et al., 2016) or criminal activities (Machin and Marie, 2006). They can also
lead to a substitution from effective search methods to ineffective ones (Van den Berg and Van der
Klaauw, 2006) and to higher rates of non-compliance and benefit sanctions (Arni and Schiprowski,
2019).
Despite the large interest in the employment effects of search conditionality, the literature has
dedicated only limited attention to the effects on job search behaviour (Arni and Schiprowski, 2019,
2015; Manning, 2009; Van den Berg and Van der Klaauw, 2006; Keeley and Robins, 1985). More
specifically, no studies have so far investigated the effects on the job search of claimants leaving the UI
system for unsubsidized unemployment. This appears a relevant gap, since it has been often reported
that a sizeable fraction of claimants drop off the register without returning to work (Avram et al.,
2018; Wolff et al., 2016; Arni et al., 2013; McVicar, 2010; Manning, 2009; Petrongolo, 2009; Card
et al., 2007).
Furthermore, a primary objective of search conditionality is “drawing a much closer link between
the receipt of benefit and the claimant’s demonstrated willingness to look for work” (Clarke, 1993).1
This objective has two implications, which may be often in conflict. On the one hand, subsidised
1This statement was made by the UK Minister of Finance Ken Clarke during the announcement of the Jobseeker’s
Allowance (JSA) held at the House of Lords on 30 November 1993.
2
unemployed are expected to engage in active search, but also, on the other hand, unemployed engaged
in active search are expected to be subsidized. While search conditionality may fulfill the first goal
by lessening the moral hazard, it may limit the capacity of the UI to insure workers against the risk
of unemployment.
In some cases, jobseekers committed to return to work may opt for un-subsidized search because
they feel excessive bureaucratic pressure, or because they are bounded to accept downgrading jobs.
In line with this insight, Arni et al. (2013) found that sanctioning increased exits to unregistered
unemployment but reduced its duration, suggesting that leavers might be highly active in their search.
Moreover, some studies report evidence that mandatory re-employment services aiming to support
claimant’s job search can act as a threat of extra administrative burden, despite they are meant to
enhance their job search abilities and job prospects. In fact, a substantial portion of claimants assigned
to programs combining monitoring and job search assistance leave the register, hence renouncing both
assistance and UI payments, just before the start of these mandatory programs, or even by simply
receiving notification to attend (Black et al., 2003; Dolton and O’Neill, 2002; Johnson and Klepinger,
1994; Klepinger et al., 2002). Job search assistance services are known as the “carrot” component of
the UI system.
The present paper analyzes the impact of tighter search-related conditions on the job search
behaviour of UI recipients exploiting exogenous variation introduced by the UK Jobseeker’s Allowance
(JSA). The JSA was introduced on 7 October 1996 and brought about a key innovation into the UK
welfare system by means of a substantial tightening of job search-related eligibility rules. Manning
(2009) and Petrongolo (2009) found that JSA increased outflows of claimants remarkably but was not
successful in moving them into jobs. Manning (2009) found that UI drop-outs generated by the JSA
were larger for groups of claimants with low initial level of search. This might suggest that claimants
leaving the UI were mostly not engaged in active search. However, Manning (2009) did not investigate
the job search response of leavers, and hence one cannot exclude that they possibly increased search
when leaving the UI.
The present analysis contributes to the literature by investigating separately the effects on search
of claimants staying in the UI pool (“stayers”) or leaving it without returning to work (“leavers”).
UK Quarterly Labour Force Survey data are used to estimate the JSA impact on two categorical vari-
ables capturing changes in the search intensity (∆s∗ R 0, where s∗ is the number of search methods)
and in the use of the Public Employment Centre (PEC) as a search method (dismissal, adoption,
stable use/non-use) respectively. The effects on the two variables are estimated overall and decom-
posed by stayers and leavers. Changes in outcomes are measured between two consecutive quarters,
using claimant transitions between the quarters around the start date to form a treatment group
(flows between 1996q3 and 1996q4), and comparing these changes with claimant transitions between
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the preceding quarters (flows between 1996q2 and 1996q3). Similar cohorts of treated and control
claimants are drawn from other years to eliminate the seasonal effect with a Diff-in-diff approach.
The purpose of this analysis is to measure the success of the JSA reform in conditioning benefit
receipt to commitment to look for work, and viceversa. On the one hand, the focus on stayers can
inform whether subsidized unemployed enhanced their job search in line with the intended goal of
moderating moral hazard. In this respect, the JSA appears an interesting case study since previous
evaluations found no impact on job inflows. Poor employment outcomes might be explained by failure
to adjust search to tougher requirements or by larger use of less effective search methods. The latter
result may arise if, for example, tighter rules led to more frequent contact of PEC, which has been
often blamed to be ineffective for finding a job (Holzer, 1988; Blau and Robins, 1990; Addison and
Portugal, 2002; Longhi and Taylor, 2011).
On the other hand, the focus on leavers can inform whether claimants weeded out from the UI
system were actually those less motivated to get back to work. Since many unemployed individuals
have liquidity constraints (Chetty, 2008), it is possible that a relevant fraction of leavers may be unable
to absorb the income loss. These individuals should be highly motivated to find a job because they
need to finance their consumption. Therefore, in order to preserve the UI insurance function, the policy
should aim to minimize outflows to un-subsidized unemployment of liquidity constrained individuals.
The present work shows that change in search intensity is a strong predictor of the liquidity status
and hence can be used to measure the success of the policy in this respect. The JSA appears an
interesting case study also from this perspective. First, it generated a large outflow into unregistered
unemployment hence providing a relevant sample to study the behaviour of leavers. Second, tighter
eligibility rules were not accompanied by extra search assistance service possibly counteracting the
increase in drop-outs (Petrongolo, 2009).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 relates the present contribution to the
relevant literature and Section 3 introduces the JSA. Section 4 presents the economic background
relevant for the study of the impact of stricter search-related eligibility criteria. Section 5 describes
data and methods. Section 6 presents and discusses the results of the JSA impact evaluation. Section 7
concludes. Additional evidence and information are reported in the Supplementary Materials (SM).
2. Related literature
The present work is related to the large body of literature investigating the effects of search-
related eligibility conditions for UI. Search conditionality aims to restore incentives to search of benefit
recipients by setting minimum search requirements, by monitoring search activity and by sanctioning
non-compliers with benefit cuts or suspensions. Such measures, either in combination or isolation,
are typically found to reduce the time spent on benefit (Johnson and Klepinger, 1994; Klepinger
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et al., 2002; Abbring et al., 2005; Lalive et al., 2007; Svarer, 2011; Van der Klaauw and Van Ours,
2013; Arni and Schiprowski, 2019). However, evidence that shorter spells on benefit correspond to
new hires is less conclusive. In fact, sometimes the impact on employment inflows is null or at best
weak (Meyer, 1995; Ashenfelter et al., 2005; Van den Berg and Van der Klaauw, 2006; Card et al.,
2007; Micklewright and Nagy, 2010; Engstro¨m et al., 2012; Cockx et al., 2018).2 Manning (2009)
and Petrongolo (2009), using Labour Force Survey and administrative data respectively, found that
tighter search conditionality introduced by the JSA increased remarkably claimant outflows but was
not successful in moving them into jobs, both in the short run (Manning, 2009) and in the long run
(Petrongolo, 2009).3
Although search-conditionality measures can generate savings in welfare expenditure by reducing
the time spent on UI, and sometimes enhance job inflows, they are also found to create a number
of unintended consequences. First, transitions to work induced by tighter rules are often found to
correspond to less paid and/or more unstable jobs (Van den Berg et al., 2016; Arni and Schiprowski,
2019, 2016, 2015; Van den Berg and Vikstro¨m, 2014; Arni et al., 2013; Petrongolo, 2009).4 Second, UI
outflows can be associated to an increase in inflows into other income support benefits, typically health-
related ones (Avram et al., 2018; Lammers et al., 2013; Fok and McVicar, 2013; Petrongolo, 2009).
Third, claimants leaving the register may drop off the formal labour market and start irregular jobs or
criminal activities (Wolff et al., 2016; Machin and Marie, 2006). Fourth, higher search requirements
can increase rates of non-compliance and benefit sanctions (Arni and Schiprowski, 2019). Furthermore,
theoretical evaluations show that search conditionality can be even socially inefficient if requirements
are too strict (Cockx et al., 2014). Overall the available evaluations have raised concerns on the utility
of search conditionality measures, leading to some criticism (Raffass, 2017).
Theoretical models analysing search-related conditions show that the effects on exits to employ-
ment are mediated by the intensity and the methods of search used (Abbring et al., 2005; Van den
Berg and Van der Klaauw, 2006; Manning, 2009). However, only few studies have evaluated these
effects empirically. Keeley and Robins (1985) found for the US that unemployed subject to search
requirements had higher number of search methods and weekly hours, but no better job hazards,
pointing to a substitution from more effective to less effective methods.
2Earlier evidence on the impact of these measures is based on a number of social experiments, especially in the US,
often combining search conditionality (“the stick”) and job search assistance (“the carrot”). See Meyer (1995) for an
extensive survey and evaluation of experiments in the US. More recent studies have been able to isolate the effect of the
stick component and to separate the effects of monitoring and sanctions within that. See McVicar (2014) and Caliendo
and Schmidl (2016) for surveys of more recent studies.
3For the Northern Ireland, McVicar (2008) found a reduction in claimant outflows as well as in employment inflows
during exogenous temporary suspensions of JSA eligibility checks due to Benefit Office refurbishments.
4Arni et al. (2013) and Van den Berg and Vikstro¨m (2014) even find that income losses due to lower earnings and
stability outweigh income gains associated to earlier employment, leading to a net loss. These negative effects can persist
in the long run suggesting that the initial occupational downgrading can lead to human capital losses (Arni et al., 2013;
Van den Berg and Vikstro¨m, 2014). Arni and Schiprowski (2019) find that an increase in search requirements by one
application has a small negative effect on the duration of re-employment spells and no effect on re-employment wages.
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A similar argument has been formalized by Van den Berg and Van der Klaauw (2006) in a the-
oretical model distinguishing between formal and informal search. Formal search is by definition
under monitoring of the Benefit’s agency, while informal search is not monitored. In their model,
increased monitoring leads to substitution from informal to formal methods, with ambiguous effect
on the job finding rate depending on the relative effectiveness of methods. Using data from a Dutch
randomized experiment, they found evidence of this substitution effect, specifically an increase in use
of Employment Offices/Agencies and job advertisements, but overall no effect on the job entry rate.
Manning (2009) found that JSA had no effect on search intensity, as measured by the reported
number of search methods and by an indicator of the time elapsed since the last search. Arni and
Schiprowski (2015) using Swiss register data found that binding requirements increased the number
of applications as well as the job finding rate of claimants, but non-binding requirements had opposite
effects. Search requirements were defined binding (respectively non-binding) if the difference between
the required and observed ex-ante number of applications was positive (respectively negative). Using
the same data set, Arni and Schiprowski (2019) found a positive but less than proportional effect of
search requirements on search efforts of claimants, suggesting the presence of imperfect compliance.5
Among the few studies investigating the impact on search behaviour, none has considered so far
the search behaviour of claimants leaving the UI system for un-subsidized unemployment. Manning
(2009) found that UI drop-outs generated by the JSA were larger for groups of claimants with low
initial level of search. This raises the possibility that claimants leaving the JSA were mostly not
engaged in active search and hence their removal can be considered an intended effect. However,
Manning (2009) did not investigate the job search response of UI leavers, and hence it is possible that
they may have switched to un-subsidized search with increased effort.
Arni et al. (2013) is the only study investigating job search outcomes of leavers. They found that
a combination of warning and enforcement of a sanction doubled exits to unregistered unemployment,
and reduced the duration of post-claim unregistered unemployment as well as post-unemployment
earnings. An increase in the hazard to employment may suggest that leavers were committed to
look for a job, although of lower quality. Moreover, the negative effect of the treatment on post-
unemployment earnings was larger for claimants experiencing a period of unregistered unemployment,
relative to claimants leaving UI for a job. This means that leavers paid a price in terms of un-
subsidized search that was not compensated by future earnings. A limitation of this study is that only
final employment outcomes were analyzed, with no evidence on the job search response. A positive
5Arni and Schiprowski (2019) used caseworker’s stringency as an instrument to estimate the impact of search effort
and search requirements on labour outcomes, measuring caseworker’s stringency by the average search requirement
assigned by the caseworker to claimants other than the focal one. In the 1st stage equations they found that an additional
application required by the caseworker to other job seekers, increased the search effort and search requirement of the
focal claimant by 0.7 and 0.47 applications, respectively, which implies a 0.67 (= 0.47/0.7) increase in the number of
applications provided by the individual for an additional required application.
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employment impact can be the result of increased search intensity and/or substitution from ineffective
to effective methods. The present work contributes to the literature by analysing the impact of JSA
on search intensity and on the use of PEC, decomposing effects by stayers and leavers.
3. The JSA
The JSA was introduced in the UK on 7 October 1996. Before the JSA, the UI system consisted
of a contributions-based benefit, called Unemployment Benefit (UB), and a means-tested allowance,
called Income Support (IS). The JSA replaced both schemes maintaining a contributory component,
known as cont-JSA, and a means-tested component, known as inc-JSA. The JSA had a retrospective
nature since the new rules were applied also to claimants starting an UB or IS spell before 7 October
1996 (Finn et al., 1996).
The cont-JSA has a limited duration of 6 months maximum, while the inc-JSA has potentially
unlimited duration. Inc-JSA is by far the most important component, since many unemployed do not
have enough contributions for entitlement to cont-JSA and can get inc-JSA as full payment in place
of or as a top up of cont-JSA. For example, considering LFS data for the 4th quarter in 1996, 76.4%
of JSA recipients were receiving inc-JSA, of which 5.3% as a top up of cont-JSA, while 23.6% were
receiving only cont-JSA.
The relevant changes introduced by this reform can be allocated to two different areas.6 First,
the JSA reduced the level and the duration of the contribution-based benefit. The payment rate of
both components was made identical to the former IS scheme level. This amounted to a 20% cut
of the contribution-based component for young people (aged 18-24) and to a negligible reduction for
older people. In the 4th quarter of 1996, individuals below 25 on cont-JSA were 4.7% of the claimant
count. The maximum duration for the contribution-based benefit was reduced from 12 to 6 months;
this had no impact on the actual length of the claim because these payments were followed by the
means-tested payments both before and after JSA. Since changes in this area affected only a modest
portion of claimants, their impact has been judged negligible (Manning, 2009; Petrongolo, 2009).
The second and most significant change was a substantial tightening of job search related eligibility
rules. The motivation for this major change was clearly stated in the White Paper accompanying the
reform’s introduction: “The taxpayer has a right to expect the commitment of unemployed people
to make every effort to get back to work” (Department for Social Security and Department for Em-
ployment, 1994). With the JSA scheme, benefit receipt is conditioned upon signing a Jobseeker’s
Agreement in which claimants commit to active search. In this agreement, claimants have to state
the types, days and hours of work they are available for, and to report a detailed breakdown of their
6See Pointer and Barnes (1997) for a detailed description of institutional and administrative aspects of the JSA. See
Finn et al. (1996) for a description of the previous UB/IS scheme.
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activities to find a job.
After signing the Jobseeker’s Agreement, claimants have to keep a thorough record of their ac-
tivities, and at fortnightly interviews, the caseworker checks whether this record complies with the
agreement. In case claimants fail to comply with the agreed commitments, they are subject to sanc-
tions consisting in a temporary suspension of JSA payments. Unlike the old rules for IS, no JSA at all
is paid during the sanction period unless the claimant qualifies for a hardship payment. Depending
on the reason for the sanction, the sanction period may be fixed of two or four weeks, or between one
week and 26 weeks.
While JSA implied a higher threat of sanctions, the actual sanctioning rate was rather low both
before and after its introduction. McKay et al. (1997) and Smith et al. (2000) analysed two separate
but nationally representative cohorts of approximately 5000 claimants surveyed before and after the
JSA. In the follow-up interview 4.4% of respondents in the pre-JSA cohort (McKay et al., 1997) and
4.6% in the post-JSA cohort (Smith et al., 2000) reported they received a sanction in the previous six
months. Sanction data are made available by the UK Department for Work and Pensions since April
2000. The monthly rate of sanctions on the claimant count has been on average 2.3% from April 2000
to December 2006, with a peak at 2.8%.
One precursor of the JSA, the Restart Program, was introduced nationally in April 1987. Restart
consisted of a 15–25 minutes interview that unemployed people were asked to attend every six months
of unemployment. During the interview, unemployed people were assessed in their search history and
were offered job search assistance and advice. Failure to attend the interview was followed by threat
of sanctions. These Restart interviews were maintained unaltered under the JSA (Pointer and Barnes,
1997).
At the time JSA was introduced, the enforcement of eligibility rules (the “stick”) was maintained
by the Benefit’s Agency, while job search assistance services (the “carrot”) were offered by the Job-
centre, who was in charge of maintaining the register of vacancies and supporting jobseekers in the
work placement. Although the two offices were placed in the same area, they were functionally and
physically separated (McVicar, 2008). Some elements of job search counseling were also provided in
the “new jobseeker interview”, during which the Jobseeker’s Agreement was set up. In this interview,
normally lasting 30 minutes, the claimant is instructed about the steps to take in order to increase the
chance of finding job and might be referred to a vacancy immediately. However, since the functioning
of the Jobcentre was not directly affected when JSA was put into force, it is thought that the job
search assistance service was not significantly altered by this reform (Petrongolo, 2009).
Subsequently, during a series of programs gradually introduced since 1999, the two types of services,
namely enforcement of eligibility rules and job search assistance, were integrated in one single office,
called “Jobcentre Plus”, with the aim of strengthening further the two components (Karagiannaki,
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2007; Bagaria et al., 2016). Along the same spirit, a second major reform of the UK welfare system,
called “New Deal”, was gradually introduced since 1998 with a strong emphasis on activation measures
towards targeted unemployed people, such as intensive job search counseling, subsidised full-time
training/education, wage subsidies paid by employers, or government provided employment (Blundell
et al., 2004). While New Deal strengthened remarkably the “carrot” component, JSA was mainly
concerned with the “stick” component. New Deal was first introduced in January 1998 only for young
people aged 18–24 who had been on JSA for 6 months. New Deal for Young People was initially
introduced as a pilot phase involving a limited set of areas, and it was rolled out nationally in April.
In July 1998, the program was extended to long-term unemployed, i.e. all those unemployed for over
2 years. After further extensions, New Deal became a permanent feature of the UK unemployment
benefit system in 2001 (Van Reenen, 2004). No other relevant policy changes were present around the
time JSA was introduced possibly confounding its effects (Machin and Marie, 2006).
4. Search-related eligibility criteria in job search models
This section covers the relevant theoretical background to study the effects of stricter search-related
criteria for UI eligibility. Following Manning (2009), a variant of the traditional search model a` la
Mortensen (1986) is considered as a reference to analyze the role of search requirements. The focus
here is on the impact on search intensity of claimants staying in the UI pool (“stayers”) or leaving
it without returning to work (“leavers”). The Section is organized as follows. Section 4.1 discusses
the relation between optimal search intensity and the strictness of search requirements. Section 4.2
identifies possible intended and unintended effects of stricter search requirements.
4.1. The relation between search intensity and search requirements
In the reference model, the unemployed worker receives an unemployment compensation b in case
she/he fulfills search requirements, captured by a non-stochastic level of search s = s, such that
the unemployed is claimant (non claimant) if s ≥ s(< s). A tightening of search requirements is
represented by an increase in s. The solution to this model corresponds to selecting the optimum
level of search s∗ that maximises the lifetime utility of the unemployed worker. The solution implies
a relationship between s∗ and the current rule s, which is qualitatively depicted in Fig. 1 (see also
Manning, 2009). Reference points A–F indicate possible configurations. The derivation of this relation
is discussed graphically in Section SM1.
Three points are relevant to draw this relation, corresponding to values of s indicated here as sL,
sH and sc: sL and sH are the optimal search effort levels when eligibility is unconstrained for the
claimant and non-claimant unemployed, respectively; sc is the maximum level of search requirement
the claimant abides by since it makes compliance equally valuable to the alternative option of ceasing
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Figure 1: Relationship between optimal search intensity s∗ and search requirement s
A
 
B
 
C
 
E
 
F
 
D
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                
                  
                 
 
 
s* 
 
claimant non-claimant 
sL 
 
sH 
 
sL 
 
s 
 
sc 
 
sH 
 
Table 1: Possible scenarios of search requirement tightening. The focus is on claimants in wave 1
(before JSA) still unemployed in wave 2 (after JSA). C = 1 indicates permanence in the claimant
pool and C = 2 indicates exit. See Fig. 1 for the corresponding reference points.
cases Wave 1 Wave 2 C ∆s∗
(points in Fig. 1)
(i)† – – 1 < 0
(ii) A B 1 = 0
(iii) A C 1 > 0
(iv) E F 2 < 0
(v) D F 2 = 0
(vi) C F 2 > 0
†Although the relation between s∗ and s is never decreasing when C = 1, case (i) is included in the list for consistency
with the empirical model, where outcomes are modeled in probabilistic terms and hence a decrease in the probability
of case (i) might be observed as an effect of the reform.
claim and lowering search to sH . One has that sL < sH because ∂s
∗/∂b < 0. The result that
∂s∗/∂b is negative derives from the fact that an increase in b reduces the relative price of leisure.
When s < sL the eligibility rule is not binding and the claimant chooses the interior solution sL (for
example, points A or B). When sL ≤ s < sc the rule is binding and the claimant chooses the corner
solution s∗ = s (points C, D, or E). When s = sc the unemployed is indifferent between meeting the
rules and leaving the claimant pool. When s > sc the unemployed chooses s
∗ = sH and leave the
claimant status because the marginal cost of compliance is higher than the marginal benefits in terms
of higher unemployment income and job offer arrivals (point F).
Fig. 1 can be used to predict the effects of a tightening in search-related criteria on search intensity
as well as on claimant state. Possible scenarios are summarised in Table 1, which identifies six
combinations of change in search intensity (∆s∗) and in claimant state (C = 1 in case of permanence
and C = 2 in case of drop out) for claimants in wave 1, following an increase in s in wave 2. Scenarios
can be illustrated graphically using reference points A–F in Fig. 1.
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Fig. 1 shows that permanence in the claimant state (C = 1) can be observed for any increase
in s below sc. Some individuals can maintain the claimant state without adjusting search intensity
(case (ii)), while others have to increase it to comply with higher requirements (case (iii)). Case (ii)
corresponds to a transition from point A to B in Fig. 1, where s is not binding in either waves. Case
(iii) corresponds to a transition such as from A to C, where s is binding only in wave 2. The distinction
between these two cases lies in the fact that s is necessarily binding in wave 2 for case (iii) but not
for case (ii) (in wave 1 s is not necessarily binding for case (iii)). In case (iii), the marginal cost to
increase s∗ is small relative to gains in terms of benefit receipt (and more job offers), therefore it is
optimal to adjust s∗ to higher requirements. When the marginal cost becomes too large it is optimal
to cease claim (cases (iv)-(vi)), which occurs when s exceeds sc in wave 2, such as in point F. When
claimants leave the register, they can possibly decrease search intensity (case (iv)), keep it stable (case
(v)), or increase it (case (vi)). These cases are illustrated by transitions from points like E, D, and C,
respectively.
Overall, while the expected effect of the reform on the claimant outflow is positive, the effect on
the average search intensity is ambiguous. In fact, the impact on search intensity should be positive
(or at least non-negative) for stayers, but it is undetermined for leavers. The distinction in search
intensity changes for stayers and leavers can be used to identify possible intended and unintended
effects of the policy. This topic is discussed in the next section.
4.2. Intended and unintended effects of search requirements
A primary goal of a policy tightening search requirements is to contrast the moral hazard induced
by the unemployment benefit, which reduces job search intensity to a socially suboptimal level. Tighter
search requirements can diminish moral hazard costs by raising search intensity of claimants. This
effect corresponds to case (iii) among the possible scenarios summarised in Table 1. Therefore, an
increase in type (iii) transitions can be considered an intended effect of the policy.
In designing optimal UI systems, the moral hazard cost has to be traded-off with consumption
smoothing gains: UI protects workers against the risk of unemployment guaranteeing them stable
consumption levels should they end up unemployed, at the cost of lower search intensity. While
tighter search requirements may diminish the moral hazard cost, they may alter the consumption
smoothing function at the same time. In fact, many unemployed individuals have limited liquid
wealth and their consumption is highly sensitive to cash on hand (Chetty, 2008). Therefore, since
tighter requirements are predicted to increase flows to un-subsidized unemployment, they may also
increase the share of unemployed individuals who are unable to smooth consumption.
The success of the policy in mitigating this trade-off can be assessed examining the search behaviour
of individuals leaving the UI payment rolls. Search effort adjusts to variations in the unemployment
compensation depending on a “moral hazard effect” as well as a “liquidity effect” (Chetty, 2008).
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The former effect implies a negative relation via substitution between leisure and consumption. The
latter effect can reinforce this negative relation via relaxation of liquidity constrains and hence reduced
pressure to find a job. The distinction between the two effects is relevant because they have opposite
welfare implications: the moral hazard effect is a socially suboptimal response to a distortion in
relative prices; the liquidity effect is a socially beneficial correction to credit and insurance market
failures (Chetty, 2008). The present analysis aims to establish a relation between the change in search
intensity and the liquidity status of leavers, pointing out possible intended and unintended outcomes
of the policy.
The theoretical framework presented in Section 4.1 can be used to derive a correspondence between
the sign of ∆s∗ and the liquidity status of leavers. As a first step, the sign of ∆s∗ can be examined
in relation to the parameters sH , sL, sc, which determine the function s
∗ (s) in Fig. 1. A formal
analysis of these relations is reported in Section SM2 in the Supplemental Materials. The main
conclusion derived from this analysis is the following: the sign of ∆s∗ for leavers is only affected by
the parameter sH , reflecting the optimal search intensity of an unemployed person without benefit.
Specifically, claimants with higher sH are more likely to drop off with increased search relative to
decreased search.
The parameter sH should be higher for liquidity constrained individuals because they are less
able to smooth consumption without benefit. Therefore, given the relation between ∆s∗ and sH ,
the following predictions can be formulated: on the one hand, liquidity constrained individuals are
more likely to increase search when they exit UI, which corresponds to case (vi) in Table 1; on
the other hand, unconstrained individuals are more likely to reduce search when they exit UI, which
corresponds to case (iv). Note that the correspondence between type (vi) (respectively (iv)) transitions
and liquidity constrained (respectively unconstrained) individuals can be stated only in probabilistic
terms. However this correspondence can be checked with available data and evidence is presented in
the empirical analysis below.
In light of the established correspondence, a possible increase in type (iv) transitions can be con-
sidered an intended effect of JSA. The search behaviour of these claimants should be influenced by
moral hazard only; therefore their exit corresponds to savings in moral hazard costs without prejudice
of their consumption smoothing capacity. Conversely, an increase in type (vi) transitions can be con-
sidered an unintended effect. In fact, since type (vi) individuals are likely to be liquidity constrained,
they may experience significant consumption cuts when leaving the UI, reflecting a weakening of
the UI insurance function. Clearly, a moral hazard effect may be present also for these workers, so
whether an increase in type (vi) transitions is socially inefficient cannot be ascertained in absolute
terms. However, minimization of these transitions is relatively efficient, provided an increase in exits
to un-subsidized unemployment is observed as an effect of the policy. Moreover, since the moral hazard
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effect can be significantly less important than the liquidity effect (Chetty, 2008), savings associated
to these transitions may be small relative to losses.
5. Data and Methods
5.1. Data
The data source is the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS) which collects quarterly interviews for about
60,000 households. Each individual is interviewed in five consecutive quarters on a rotating panel basis,
so approximately 20% of the sample is replaced each quarter by a cohort of new entrants. Because the
JSA reform was introduced on Monday, 7 October 1996, all calendar quarters are postponed by one
week in the data, considering the first week of any quarter as the last week of the previous quarter.
This change does not impair the LFS sampling design since each individual is interviewed in the
same week across quarters and weekly samples are nationally representative (see Office for National
Statistics, 2016).
The questions in the LFS about job search methods are used to track changes in job search intensity.
Following the empirical literature, a proxy for the job search intensity can be constructed by counting
the number of methods the respondent used (Holzer, 1988; Blau and Robins, 1990; Wadsworth, 1991;
Schmitt and Wadsworth, 1993; Gregg and Wadsworth, 1996; Boeheim and Taylor, 2001; Addison
and Portugal, 2002; Weber and Mahringer, 2008; Manning, 2009; Bachmann and Baumgarten, 2012;
Morescalchi, 2016). Considering a total of 14 methods, this variable ranges from 0 to 14 according to
the number of positive answers (see Section SM3 for the list of methods).
The number of search methods can be an imperfect measure of search intensity, as it assumes iden-
tical level of effort associated to each method. However, previous evidence suggests that this variable
is a somewhat reliable proxy for search intensity, because it is normally found to be strongly related
to job hazards (Holzer, 1988; Gregg and Wadsworth, 1996; Boeheim and Taylor, 2001; Morescalchi,
2016), notably in British data (Gregg and Wadsworth, 1996; Boeheim and Taylor, 2001; Morescalchi,
2016), and to other variables coherently with expectations (Holzer, 1988; Blau and Robins, 1990;
Schmitt and Wadsworth, 1993; Gregg and Wadsworth, 1996; Addison and Portugal, 2002; Weber and
Mahringer, 2008; Morescalchi, 2016). Moreover, considering the change in this variable for the same
individual between two following quarters reduces remarkably the risk of measurement error arising
by possible subjective over/under-reporting behaviour.
5.2. Identification strategy
The reference population considered in the analysis is made of non-employed claimants in a given
quarter, called wave 1, and their status transition is tracked in the following quarter, called wave 2.
Following Manning (2009), a treatment group is formed by collecting all claimants interviewed in
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1996q3 (the 3rd quarter of 1996), who are also interviewed in 1996q4, (the 4th quarter of 1996). In
1996q3 claimants are not treated as they are still under the old rules, but they are treated in 1996q4
and movements from the initial status are affected by the new rules.
Since 7 October 1996, the date when JSA came into force, all new and ongoing claimant spells
were subject to the new regime (Finn et al., 1996). In particular, all existing spells were immediately
handed over to the JSA system and claimants were treated as having made a Jobseekers’ Agreement
even for the period before its actual completion, recovering information from their initial claim form
(Finn et al., 1996, pp. 64). Given this retroactive feature, there were no overlaps in claimant spells
subject to the old and new regimes. Therefore it is not possible to create a control group of claimants
unaffected by the reform for which outcomes are measured at the same time of treated claimants.
A control group is formed using the closest pair of quarters available before the JSA introduc-
tion; namely, all claimants in 1996q2 and followed through 1996q3 are considered as a control group.
This choice allows to minimize possible differences in cyclical factors between treated and untreated
claimants. Seasonal effects are eliminated with a Diff-in-diff strategy drawing similar cohorts of
claimants from other years (Manning, 2009).
Four cohorts of claimants in the two years preceding (1994, 1995) and following (1997, 1998) the
introduction of JSA are used to implement the Diff-in-diff. Similarly to 1996, claimant transitions
from q3 to q4 (q3q4) and from q2 to q3 (q2q3) serve as treatment and control group respectively. Note
that the terminology is kept identical to 1996 for simplicity, although all (respectively no) groups
after (respectively before) 1996 receive the JSA treatment. Since eligibility rules are stable in all
years considered except for 1996, the comparison between q3q4 and q2q3 transitions in any of these
years isolates a seasonal effect. These years can be used to form valid comparison groups under the
assumption that the seasonal effect is not influenced by the (presence/absence of) JSA in these years.
Under the assumption that the seasonal effect is stable across years, one extra cohort (year) would
be enough to identify the effect of JSA. However, additional yearly cohorts are used to account for
possible yearly fluctuations and hence better pin down the seasonal effect (Petrongolo, 2009). Years
before and after 1996 are used at the same time to account for a possible trend in the seasonal
effect. In existing JSA evaluations conducted by Manning (2009) and Petrongolo (2009) comparison
groups are drawn from either years before or after 1996, respectively, and hence do not take into
account possible persistence in the outcome variables. Moreover, to assess robustness of results across
alternative combinations of yearly cohorts, the four following comparison groups are considered here:
(1) 94-95-97-98; (2) 95-97-98; (3) 94-95-97; (4) 95-97.
The impact of the policy change can be captured by response differences between the treatment
and control groups as long as they are similar in observable and unobservable characteristics. Ran-
domness of the survey sampling design makes it quite unlikely that they differ systematically unless
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in case of sampling errors or non-response bias. Non response-bias might originate in the present
set-up by differences in response patterns across quarters and years. However these effects should be
eliminated by the Diff-in-diff approach. Table 2 shows Diff-in-diff in weighted averages of observable
characteristics calculated comparing treated and untreated claimants in 1996 and then comparing the
1996 cohort with alternative comparison cohorts. Significant Diff-in-diff statistics are not found for any
of the control variables, suggesting that the 1996 cohort and alternative comparison groups are well
balanced once seasonal effects are eliminated. Possible non-response bias is also taken into account by
using sampling weights in estimations. Although treatment and control groups appear well balanced,
it is worthwhile to perform additional checks on the validity of control groups as counterfactuals.
These checks are discussed in Section 6.4 and overall provide support on their validity.
Table 2: Sample statistics for claimants in 1996q3 and Difference-in-differences in variable means
calculated comparing between q3 and q2 and between 1996 and control years. *** significant 0.1%,
** significant 1%, * significant 5%. Standard errors in parenthesis.
96 94-95-97-98 95-97-98 94-95-97 95-97
mean se DiD se DiD se DiD se DiD se
Female 0.267 (0.442) -0.004 (0.014) -0.003 (0.015) -0.007 (0.015) -0.007 (0.016)
Age 35.206 (12.316) 0.044 (0.41) -0.011 (0.434) -0.055 (0.417) -0.197 (0.453)
Married 0.308 (0.462) 0.001 (0.015) -0.001 (0.016) 0.000 (0.016) -0.003 (0.017)
Nr. kids 0—18 y 0.678 (1.119) -0.029 (0.038) -0.033 (0.04) -0.021 (0.038) -0.021 (0.042)
Degree or equiv. 0.101 (0.301) 0.014 (0.009) 0.012 (0.01) 0.016 (0.009) 0.015 (0.01)
Higher education 0.046 (0.208) -0.001 (0.007) 0.002 (0.007) -0.002 (0.007) 0.000 (0.008)
GCE, A or eq. 0.208 (0.406) 0.012 (0.013) 0.009 (0.014) 0.013 (0.014) 0.01 (0.015)
GCSE A*–C or eq. 0.219 (0.413) 0.004 (0.013) 0.004 (0.014) 0.004 (0.014) 0.003 (0.015)
Other qual. 0.170 (0.375) -0.01 (0.013) -0.013 (0.014) -0.008 (0.013) -0.011 (0.014)
No qual. 0.257 (0.437) -0.019 (0.015) -0.014 (0.016) -0.022 (0.015) -0.018 (0.016)
Last job < 3 m 0.109 (0.312) -0.016 (0.01) -0.012 (0.011) -0.017 (0.011) -0.013 (0.012)
Last job 3—6 m 0.114 (0.318) 0.001 (0.011) 0.001 (0.011) -0.002 (0.011) -0.005 (0.012)
Last job 6—12 m 0.154 (0.361) -0.01 (0.012) -0.02 (0.013) -0.004 (0.012) -0.013 (0.013)
Last job 1—2 y 0.149 (0.356) -0.006 (0.012) -0.005 (0.013) -0.005 (0.012) -0.004 (0.013)
Last job 2—3 y 0.090 (0.286) 0.011 (0.009) 0.011 (0.01) 0.011 (0.01) 0.012 (0.01)
Last job 3—4 y 0.067 (0.249) 0.002 (0.008) 0.004 (0.009) 0.003 (0.008) 0.006 (0.009)
Last job 4—5 y 0.059 (0.236) 0.002 (0.008) 0.004 (0.008) 0.000 (0.008) 0.001 (0.009)
Last job > 5 y 0.166 (0.373) 0.009 (0.012) 0.014 (0.013) 0.006 (0.012) 0.011 (0.013)
No job before 0.092 (0.29) 0.006 (0.009) 0.003 (0.01) 0.007 (0.009) 0.004 (0.01)
North East 0.056 (0.23) 0.002 (0.007) 0.004 (0.008) 0.002 (0.008) 0.005 (0.008)
North West 0.116 (0.32) -0.001 (0.011) -0.003 (0.011) -0.003 (0.011) -0.008 (0.012)
York. & Humber. 0.087 (0.283) -0.001 (0.009) -0.004 (0.01) -0.002 (0.009) -0.006 (0.01)
East Midlands 0.065 (0.247) -0.001 (0.008) 0.000 (0.009) 0.000 (0.008) 0.002 (0.009)
West Midlands 0.090 (0.287) -0.013 (0.01) -0.014 (0.01) -0.012 (0.01) -0.012 (0.011)
Eastern 0.086 (0.281) 0.012 (0.009) 0.013 (0.009) 0.012 (0.009) 0.013 (0.01)
London 0.176 (0.381) -0.006 (0.013) -0.003 (0.014) -0.006 (0.013) -0.004 (0.014)
South East 0.096 (0.294) -0.003 (0.01) -0.004 (0.01) -0.002 (0.01) -0.003 (0.011)
South West 0.074 (0.261) 0.006 (0.008) 0.006 (0.009) 0.008 (0.009) 0.01 (0.009)
Wales 0.055 (0.229) -0.003 (0.007) -0.004 (0.008) -0.003 (0.007) -0.004 (0.008)
Scotland 0.099 (0.299) 0.008 (0.01) 0.008 (0.01) 0.006 (0.01) 0.005 (0.011)
Nobs 2383 17670 11419 14968 8717
Given the nature of treatment and control groups and the LFS design, potential attrition bias needs
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to be investigated. Attrition may introduce bias if differences between attriters and non-attriters are
systematically related to the treatment status. Section SM12 reports attrition statistics comparing
claimant attriters and non-attriters after differencing out across relevant quarters and years. Since no
significant differences are found for any of the observed characteristics, attrition does not appear to
be a concern.
5.3. Outcome variables
The impact of JSA is estimated on two sets of multinomial outcomes. The first set is based
on a measure of change in search intensity and the second set on transitions in the use of Public
Employment Centre (PEC) as search method. Both sets distinguish effects by claimants staying in
and leaving the register, where the discrete variables C indicates transitions from the claimant status.
Because search behaviour for individuals finding a job in wave 2 is not observed, all variables are
complemented with an additional outcome corresponding to transitions to employment (C = 3).
The first set of outcome variables makes use of the variables C, ∆s∗, and (C,∆s∗), where ∆s∗
indicates change in job search intensity between wave 1 and wave 2, and s∗ is proxied by the count
of search methods (see Section SM3 for the list of search methods). According to this definition the
average search intensity is 4.3 methods for claimants in 1996q3. Outcomes are defined in line with the
outcomes discussed in Table 1 of Section 4 as follows:
(a) C captures claim and job transitions, with three different possible cases: {C = 1} if still non-
employed and claimant in wave 2, {C = 2} if still non-employed but no longer claimant, {C = 3}
if employed.
(b) ∆s∗ is represented by the following four possible outcomes: {∆s∗ < 0}; {∆s∗ = 0}; {∆s∗ > 0};
{C = 3}.
(c) (C,∆s∗) is constructed as the joint discrete distribution of C and ∆s∗, giving rise to the following
seven possible outcomes: {C = 1,∆s∗ < 0}; {C = 1, ∆s∗ = 0}; {C = 1, ∆s∗ > 0}; {C = 2,
∆s∗ < 0}; {C = 2, ∆s∗ = 0}; {C = 2, ∆s∗ > 0}; {C = 3}.
As concerns the variable ∆s∗, the precision of the proposed measuring approach may be affected
by discreteness of the search effort proxy and by non-homogeneity of search methods. In particular,
the indicator may be less precise if the distribution of search effort is highly non-homogenous across
methods and over time. In case of longitudinal fluctuations in effort but homogenous distribution
across methods, relatively small variations in effort may occur even with unchanged count of methods
and hence may be improperly imputed to ∆s∗ = 0. When effort is stable longitudinally but heteroge-
neous across methods, precision is highly dependent on search methods switching. Without switching,
the sign of ∆s∗ can be estimated more precisely. Conversely, measurement may be less precise with
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switching because small changes in the count may be associated to larger volatility in effort; even in
this case ∆s∗ = 0 may be overestimated.
The second set of outcome variables considers the use of Public Employment Centres (PEC) as
search method in wave 1 and/or wave 2. Use of PEC is defined as use of any of the following search
methods: (1) Visit a Jobcentre, (2) Visit a Careers office, (3) Visit a Jobclub. Following this definition,
the share of claimants using PEC in 1996q3 was 76.2%. Almost all of these claimants approached
a Jobcentre (75.8%), the office in charge of offering the work placement/job-seeking service, while
only 15.8% used the other two offices. PEC was also quite frequently used by non-claimants (53.6%),
suggesting that this search method was not a prerogative of unemployed workers on UI payment rolls.
The following outcome variables are hence defined:
(d) MPEC equal −1 when PEC is abandoned from wave 1 to 2 (i.e. it is used in wave 1 but not in
wave 2); MPEC = 1 corresponds to adopting PEC from wave 1 to 2 (i.e. it is not used in wave 1
but it is in wave 2); MPEC = 0 corresponds to the residual cases, i.e. PEC is always or never
used. The outcome variable is hence represented by the following four states: {MPEC = −1};
{MPEC = 1}; {MPEC = 0}; {C = 3}.
(e) (MPEC , C) is constructed as the joint discrete distribution of MPEC and C, giving rise to the
following seven possible outcomes: {C = 1, MPEC = −1}; {C = 1, MPEC = 1}; {C = 1,
MPEC = 0}; {C = 2, MPEC = −1}; {C = 2, MPEC = 1}; {C = 2, MPEC = 0}; {C = 3}.
Outcomes related to search behaviour defined in this Section requires discussion on possible se-
lection issues. Since search is not observed for individuals finding job (C = 3), and these individuals
are likely to represent a specific population with better employment prospects, the resulting sample
of jobseekers (C = 1, 2) may be negatively selected on employability. Two possible selection issues
may follow. First, external validity of results may be limited because inference cannot be extended
to this population. Second, internal validity may be affected too if the composition between treated
and untreated groups becomes unbalanced after eliminating this group. This risk is more pronounced
when employment inflows are significantly larger in the treatment group, because the negative selec-
tion would be stronger in the treatment group. Since earlier studies reported a null impact of JSA on
employment inflows, this issue might be of minor concern in the present analysis.
5.4. Econometric model
The outcome variables defined in Section 5.3 are categorical, therefore, unlike Manning (2009) and
Petrongolo (2009), non-linear multinomial models are used to estimate the effect of JSA. Specifically,
the generic outcome variable y is modelled by means of a multinomial logistic distribution, with
probability of a given outcome j equal to
P (y = j|Z) = gj(β′jZ) j = 1, . . . , J, (1)
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where J is the number of outcomes, gj equals the multinomial probability and Z is the matrix of
regressors. In eq. (1) and hereafter the subscript i indexing individuals is omitted for simplicity.
Estimation of the model is performed by maximum likelihood.
The linear index β′Z is defined for a generic individual as follows:
β′Z = β0 + β1 d96 + β2 dq3q4 + β3 d96 · dq3q4 + δ′X, (2)
where dq3q4 is equal to 1 for claimants interviewed in q3 and followed through q4 in any year, and it
is equal to 0 for claimants interviewed in q2 and followed through q3, d96 is a year dummy, and the
vector X contains additional year dummies and variables controlling for observable characteristics in
wave 1. The set of controls comprises: gender, age, quadratic age, marriage status, number of kids
below 19 in household, highest education dummies, duration since last job and regional dummies, (see
Table 2).
In a linear case, the parameter β3 associated to the interaction term d96 · dq3q4 would capture the
Diff-in-diff estimate of the JSA average treatment effect (ATE). In the present non-linear model, the
following J · 4 probabilities are needed to construct estimates of ATEs:
P jt,q(X
◦) = P (y = j|d96 = t, dq3q4 = q,X = X◦), (3)
where t ∈ {0, 1} and q ∈ {0, 1} determine the four possible combinations of time and treatment status
in the Diff-in-diff, j ∈ {1, . . . , J} represent possible outcomes, and appropriate values are used for X◦.
J Diff-in-diff coefficients are identified as DiDj(X) = (P j1,1(X)−P j1,0(X))−(P j0,1(X)−P j0,0(X)), where
DiDj(X◦) is the JSA effect on the probability of experiencing transition j with values of covariates X◦.
The probabilities P jt,q(X
◦) are estimated replacing parameters with maximum likelihood estimates.
The ATE is then estimated as the average of the DiDj for each individual within the sample,
i.e. ATEj = N−1
∑N
i=1DiD
j(Xi) (see Wooldridge, 2010, Section 15.6). Analytical standard errors
for these coefficients are computed using the Delta method. Remark that ATEj-s must sum up to
zero because they capture changes in probabilities. As a consequence, each of them is compensated
by other effects reflecting the same behavioural change. For example, a decrease in the claimant
permanence (P (C = 1)) necessarily corresponds to an increase in claimant outflows (P (C = 2))
and/or in employment inflows (P (C = 3)). Interpretation of results will focus on outcomes associated
to behavioural change, considering the following outcomes as their counterparts: P (C = 1) in (a);
P (∆s∗ = 0) in (b); P (C = ·,∆s∗ = 0) in (c); P (MPEC = 0) in (d); P (C = ·,MPEC = 0) in (e).
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6. Results
This section presents evidence on the JSA ATE. Section 6.1 and 6.2 report estimates of ATE on
various transition probabilities, as captured by the outcome variables defined in Section 5.3. Section 6.3
reports estimates of ATE on employment outcomes of claimants leaving the register without returning
to work. Finally Section 6.4 reports robustness checks and complementary evidence.
6.1. Search intensity and claimant flows
Table 3 reports ATEs on the change of claimant status, the change in search intensity and their
interaction. Panel (a) shows that JSA increased transition in non-claimant non-employed status
(C = 2) in the range of 5.3–5.8 p.p., without increasing transitions to job (C = 3). These results
confirm earlier evidence of a JSA sizeable impact on claimant outflows, without causing an influx into
jobs.
Panel (b) shows the JSA effect on job search patterns of non-employed (∆s∗) jointly with transi-
tions into employment (C = 3). P ?(·) indicates P (·|C ∈ {1, 2}), i.e. results for non-employed people
in both waves. The effects on the probabilities of increasing the level of search and of reducing it
are respectively positive and negative in all models. However, while the effect on P ?(∆s∗ > 0) is
significant in three models and close to significance in the fourth model, the effect on P ?(∆s∗ < 0)
never reaches significance. These results imply that in three cases out of four a significant share of
individuals had a higher level of search with JSA than the level they would have had in the absence
of JSA. This evidence appears in contrast with Manning (2009) who found no effect on the average
search intensity. Remark that Manning (2009) used a cardinal measure of search intensity while the
dependent variable chosen here is categorical for consistency with the theoretical background. Re-
sults using a cardinal measure of search intensity using the number of search methods are reported
in Section SM4; the JSA effect on this variable is significant in three cases but overall is quite small.
Overall, it is found that a significant portion of individuals increased search because of JSA, although
by a small magnitude on average.
One may wish to investigate whether the effect on search was different between claimants staying
in (“stayers”) and leaving the register (“leavers”), as this may have very different policy implications
as discussed in Section 4. Results are reported in panel (c) of Table 3, which shows estimates for the
case when the sign of ∆s∗ is considered jointly with C, giving rise to the six possible outcomes defined
in Table 1 (see Section SM6 for estimates of the multinomial logit model).
Three main findings can be singled out. Firstly, while JSA had no significant impact on the
probability of keep claiming with higher search level (case (iii) of Table 1), it reduced the probability
of decreasing search (case (i)). A negative impact on ∆s∗ < 0 means that under the JSA some
claimants had higher search than they would have had without the JSA, perhaps by avoiding to drop
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Table 3: JSA ATE on claimant behaviour with alternative control years.
Treatment = 96
94-95-97-98 95-97-98 94-95-97 95-97
(a) C
P (C = 1) −0.074∗∗∗ −0.065∗∗∗ −0.076∗∗∗ −0.065∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
P (C = 2) 0.055∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
P (C = 3) 0.019 0.012 0.019 0.009
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
(b) ∆s∗
P ?(∆s∗ < 0) −0.020 −0.009 −0.024 −0.013
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
P ?(∆s∗ = 0) −0.028 −0.026 −0.029 −0.028
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017)
P ?(∆s∗ > 0) 0.031∗ 0.026 0.037∗∗ 0.034∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
P (C = 3) 0.017 0.010 0.017 0.007
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
(c) (C,∆s∗)
P (C = 1,∆s∗ < 0) −0.034∗∗ −0.024 −0.039∗∗ −0.029∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
P (C = 1,∆s∗ = 0) −0.050∗∗ −0.044∗∗ −0.052∗∗ −0.046∗∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017)
P (C = 1,∆s∗ > 0) 0.009 0.003 0.014 0.009
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
P (C = 2,∆s∗ < 0) 0.014∗ 0.015∗ 0.014∗ 0.016∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
P (C = 2,∆s∗ = 0) 0.020∗∗ 0.016 0.022∗∗ 0.017∗
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
P (C = 2,∆s∗ > 0) 0.021∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
P (C = 3) 0.019 0.012 0.019 0.009
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
Nobs 22399 16148 19697 13446
Notes: *** significant 0.1%, ** significant 1%, * significant 5%. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
P ?(·) := P (·|C ∈ {1, 2}). The outcome variables (a), (b) and (c) make use of the variables C and ∆s∗. C identifies
transitions from claimant status in wave 1 as follows: C = 1 if still non-employed and claimant in wave 2, C = 2 if
still non-employed but no longer claimant, C = 3 if employed. ∆s∗ is an indicator of change in job search intensity
(∆s∗ R 0) between wave 1 and wave 2. Reported ATEs are computed from multinomial logit models with Diff-in-diff
specification and correspond to changes in the probability of performing the specified transition. See Table SM7 for
multinomial logit estimates for case (c), using 94-95-97-98 as control years. The following control variables are used
in the multinomial logit specification: gender, number of kids (< 19), age, age2, education, duration since last job,
marriage status, region. See Table 2 for descriptive statistics.
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off active search.
Secondly, JSA had positive and significant impact on the probability of abandoning the register
with reduced search (case (iv)). The framework proposed in Section 4 suggests that case (iv) claimants
are unlikely to be liquidity constrained and hence their search behaviour may be influenced by moral
hazard only. Since these exits should be associated to savings in moral hazard costs without altering
consumption smoothing, this finding suggests that JSA was successful in removing targeted individuals
from the claimant register.
Thirdly, JSA had positive and significant impact on the probability to increase search while leaving
the register (case (vi)). Case (vi) claimants correspond to around 2% of the sample, therefore an
estimated ATE of above 2% implies that JSA more than doubled the size of this category. Considering
the ATE reported in panel (a), this effect accounts for a portion of the total claimant outflow generated
by JSA in the range of 38-45%. The framework proposed in Section 4 suggests that case (vi) claimants
are likely to be liquidity constrained and hence they may experience significant consumption cuts when
exiting the claimant pool. Since these claimants are supposed to be highly motivated to look for job,
unlike type (iv) claimants, this evidence suggests that JSA removed from the claimant register also
individuals who were not targeted; the administrative burden required to maintain eligibility under the
JSA may have induced several claimants to search for a job outside the Benefit’s Agency monitoring.
The combined evidence of positive impact on case (iv) and case (vi) suggests that JSA had an
ambiguous impact on search intensity of those abandoning the register. However the relative risk ratio
(RRR) between outcomes (vi) and (iv) estimated by the multinomial logit is significant and ranges
between 1.999 (p < 0.01) and 2.050 (p < 0.01) (see Section SM6 for results corresponding to the first
model). This implies that the removal effect was relatively larger for workers who were not targeted.
Results in Section SM4 show that the effect on the cardinal measure of search intensity is positive
for leavers, suggesting that incremental effects on type (vi) transitions dominated decrease effects on
type (iv) transitions on average.
The hypothesized correspondence between type (vi) (respectively (iv)) transitions and liquidity
constrained (respectively unconstrained) claimants has been checked against available data. Statistics
and technical details are reported in Section SM5. JSA relative ATEs between liquidity constrained
and unconstrained individuals have been estimated with a Diff-in-diff-in-diff strategy, augmenting
the linear index with a liquidity status indicator and interactions terms. Following Chetty (2008),
liquidity constrains are proxied by two indicators for having to make mortgage payments, and for
single- versus dual-earner status. A third indicator is constructed as their product. Similarly to
Chetty (2008), these indicators suggest that a substantial portion of unemployed individuals might
be liquidity constrained. Results show that the JSA impact on type (vi) transitions was significantly
larger for liquidity constrained claimants for all the three indicators employed. Conversely, the JSA
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impact on type (iv) transitions was lower for constrained claimants, with an insignificant effect only for
the single-earner indicator. Both results are hence consistent with the hypothesized correspondence.
Furthermore, in both cases the effect size is generally larger than the absolute effects in Table 3,
suggesting that the correspondence may be very precise.
6.2. Search via PEC and claimant flows
Table 4 reports JSA ATEs on the use of PEC (panel (d)), also in association with the decomposition
by claimant flows (panel (e)). P ?(·) indicates P (·|C ∈ {1, 2}). Looking at the baseline transitions
(panel (d)), there is no evidence of a JSA impact on the dismissal of PEC. The JSA impact on PEC
inflows is positive, but never reaches statistical significance either. However these results hide potential
differences in behaviour between stayers and leavers.
Table 4: JSA ATE on use of PEC with alternative control years.
Treatment = 96
94-95-97-98 95-97-98 94-95-97 95-97
(d) MPEC
P ?(MPEC = −1) −0.007 −0.004 −0.009 −0.008
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
P ?(MPEC = 1) 0.011 0.009 0.013 0.011
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
P ?(MPEC = 0) −0.022 −0.016 −0.021 −0.012
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
P (C = 3) 0.018 0.011 0.017 0.008
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
(e) (MPEC , C)
P (C = 1,MPEC = −1) −0.011 −0.008 −0.013 −0.011
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
P (C = 1,MPEC = 1) 0.003 0.000 0.005 0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
P (C = 1,MPEC = 0) −0.067∗∗∗ −0.058∗∗∗ −0.069∗∗∗ −0.058∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017)
P (C = 2,MPEC = −1) 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
P (C = 2,MPEC = 1) 0.008
∗∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.010∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
P (C = 2,MPEC = 0) 0.044
∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011)
P (C = 3) 0.020 0.013 0.019 0.009
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
Nobs 22310 16092 19617 13399
Notes: *** significant 0.1%, ** significant 1%, * significant 5%. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
P ?(·) := P (·|C ∈ {1, 2}). The outcome variables (d) and (e) make use of the variables C and MPEC . C identifies
transitions from claimant status in wave 1 as follows: C = 1 if still non-employed and claimant in wave 2, C = 2 if still
non-employed but no longer claimant, C = 3 if employed. MPEC identifies transitions involving the search method
PEC for claimants in wave 1, such as abandoning PEC (MPEC = −1) in wave 2, adopting PEC (MPEC = 1) in wave
2, or consistently using or not PEC in both waves (MPEC = 0). Reported ATEs are computed from multinomial logit
models with Diff-in-diff specification and correspond to changes in the probability of performing the specified transition.
The following control variables are used in the multinomial logit specification: gender, number of kids (< 19), age, age2,
education, duration since last job, marriage status, region. See Table 2 for descriptive statistics.
Panel (e) shows results decomposing the total effect by claimant flows. Considering stayers, a null
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impact on the use of PEC may be interpreted as a sign that stayers were already making use of this
method.
Considering leavers, JSA had no effect on dismissal of PEC, but led a significant share to adopt it.
Since claimants signing off and adopting PEC correspond to around 0.5% of the sample, an estimated
ATE in the range of 0.8–1% implies that JSA more than doubled this category. The increase in PEC
inflows is associated with the increase in the share of claimants dropping off benefit with higher search
documented in Table 3.
What appears relevant here is that, despite a substantial portion of claimants abandoning the JSA
are found to search more, revealing commitment to search, there is no evidence of escapes from PEC,
but rather of increased PEC inflows. Therefore, while these committed jobseekers are reluctant to
search through the administrative steps dictated by the new rules, they may be willing at the same
time to receive more informal assistance from the public job search service. They appear to shift
demand of public service from formal assistance toward informal assistance.
6.3. Employment outcomes of leavers
Since one of the most relevant effects of JSA was to increase UI drop-outs of unemployed people,
including those motivated to re-enter employment, it appears of interest to investigate the employment
outcomes of this category. A linear Diff-in-diff approach was implemented to estimate JSA ATEs on
employment outcomes for the sample of leavers. Outcomes are observed in q1 of the following year
for the treatment group, and in q4 of the same year for the control group. Although outcomes for the
1996 control group are observed right after the introduction of JSA, they should not be affected by
the change of regime because leavers should be off the UI system since the previous quarter. Remark
that the sample used in this analysis contains individuals observed in three consecutive quarters, and
observed as unemployed at least in the first two; therefore it is quite restricted and made of relatively
long-term unemployed. These characteristics of the sample should be kept in mind when interpreting
estimates.
Table 5 reports estimates of JSA ATEs. Results show that the impact of JSA one quarter after
leaving the UI pool is positive but statistically insignificant for employment status, hours workers,
and full-time employment. No significant effects are found for permanent/temporary contract either.
Since JSA led to a significant increase in the share of leavers increasing search and in their average
intensity, the absence of subsequent employment effects for this category could suggest that they
increased the use of ineffective methods. Since PEC is often found to be ineffective for employment,
this interpretation is consistent with the estimated increase in transitions to PEC. However, the failure
to observe a significant effect on the probability to find job may be also due to the small sample size.
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Table 5: JSA ATE on employment outcomes of leavers with alternative control years.
Treatment = 96
94-95-97-98 95-97-98 94-95-97 95-97
Employment
ATE 0.032 0.030 0.037 0.038
(0.029) (0.031) (0.029) (0.032)
Nobs 2058 1539 1842 1323
Permanent
ATE 0.012 0.007 0.009 0.000
(0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.022)
Nobs 2011 1502 1800 1291
Full-time
ATE 0.017 0.015 0.022 0.024
(0.022) (0.024) (0.022) (0.025)
Nobs 2058 1539 1842 1323
Weekly hours
ATE 1.453 1.332 1.655 1.632
(0.996) (1.096) (1.002) (1.125)
Nobs 2047 1530 1831 1314
Notes: *** significant 0.1%, ** significant 1%, * significant 5%. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. The
variables Employment, Permanent and Full-time are binary, while Weekly hours is continuous. Estimates are carried
out by OLS. The sample is made of claimants in wave 1 leaving the register without job in wave 2 and still observed
in the following quarter. The following control variables are used: gender, number of kids (< 19), age, age2, education,
duration since last job, marriage status, region.
6.4. Robustness checks and complementary evidence
Several robustness checks and complementary analyses were performed. First, the presence of JSA
anticipatory effects was tested. If some individuals anticipate the policy change, reported estimates
may capture causal effects only in part. Section SM7 reports anticipatory effects tests with respect
to ATE-s reported in Table 3 and Table 4. If individuals tended to modify their behaviour before
the date JSA came into force, one would expect to observe changes between q2 and q3 in the year
JSA was introduced but not in others. Therefore the tests consider claimant flows between q2 and
q3 (q2q3) in 1996 as a fictitious treatment group and compare them to transitions between q1 and
q2 (q1q2), under the assumption that the latter transitions are not affected by anticipatory effects.
Similar cohorts are drawn from other years to implement the usual Diff-in-diff set-up. In this case,
significant coefficients would point out anticipatory effects. Since no significant tests are found for
relevant outcomes in Table 3 and Table 4, ATEs reported in these Tables do not seem to be invalidated
by JSA anticipatory effects. A possible shortcoming of the proposed check is that anticipatory effects
may not be detected if the policy is anticipated well in advance, so that q1q2 and q2q3 transitions
would be influenced similarly. While it seems quite unlikely to observe such an early reaction, this
possibility was taken into account re-estimating models without q1q2 transitions. In this case, the Diff-
in-diff boils down to a simple cross-year comparison of q2q3 transitions. No evidence of anticipatory
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effects is found in this case either.7 Remark that also Manning (2009) and Petrongolo (2009) found
no evidence of JSA anticipatory effects on claimant flows.
Second, Section SM8 reports falsification tests on “placebo” JSA reforms. The tests are based
on the same sample used in estimation with the exclusion of 1996. Placebo treatment groups are
formed using comparison years one at a time, and then compared to the group of residual comparison
years within the usual Diff-in-diff setting. Resulting estimates test the equality of seasonal effects
between the focal year and the others. Evidence of no significant deviations would indicate that the
seasonal effect is stable across years, supporting the validity of the identification strategy. Conversely,
instability in seasonal effects would indicate that ATEs reported in Table 3 and Table 4 may reflect
yearly fluctuations, raising concerns on their interpretation as causal effects. Results in Section SM8
show that statistically significant deviations are found only occasionally in a limited set of outcomes.
Moreover, such fluctuations appear to influence only marginally the corresponding ATEs reported
in Table 3 and Table 4; in fact, these coefficients are quite stable across alternative combinations of
comparison years in terms of sign, magnitude and significance. Overall this evidence supports to the
validity of the identification strategy.
Third, a possible influence of unobserved heterogeneity was checked. Whenever assignment to
treatment is random, the straight comparison in outcomes between treated and untreated identifies
the treatment effect. In this case estimation of the treatment effect is not affected by including control
variables in regression models. Section SM9 reports additional estimates without inclusion of control
variables, showing remarkably similar results to the ones reported in Table 3 and Table 4. This
evidence suggests that, once seasonal and cyclical factors are eliminated with the Diff-in-diff, residual
differences in observed individual characteristics have limited impact on results, and hence omission
of unobservable predictors is unlikely to affect estimation significantly. The validity of the Diff-in-diff
strategy appears further supported.
Fourth, a check was performed on the possible impact of the New Deal program on the validity
of 1998 as comparison year. New Deal was first introduced in 1998 only for specific categories (see
Section 3), and scaled up in later years. Since the program offers a variety of activation measures that
may affect the search behaviour and employment chances of claimants, outcomes for the 1998 sample
might be altered by its introduction, possibly confounding JSA treatment effect estimates. However,
the fraction of claimants reportedly on New Deal in the 1998 sample is only 3.3%, suggesting that
this group is unlikely to introduce bias. Nevertheless, the sensitivity of results to exclusion of these
individuals was also assessed. Estimates after eliminating these cases are reported in Section SM10,
and they are almost identical to corresponding estimates in Table 3 and Table 4. While the share of
7These results are made available by the authors upon request.
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individuals on New Deal was too small to affect estimates, it is possible that the policy affected the
behaviour of a larger share of claimants. This could be the case for individuals who were close to the
duration cutoff for New Deal eligibility and might eventually enter the program. However, placebo
tests reported in Section SM8 show no significant seasonal effects for 1998, bearing no evidence that
New Deal might have affected the outcomes of interest. Likewise, Table 3 and Table 4 show that
results are not sensitive to inclusion of 1998 in the control group. Overall, available evidence shows
no effects of the policy change that might question the validity of 1998 as comparison year.
Fifth, results on switches in the use of PEC were complemented by a similar analysis considering a
more restrictive definition of method use; namely, whether PEC is used as the main method of search.
This analysis can reveal additional information on changes in the relative importance of PEC in search
strategies. ATE estimates, anticipatory effects and placebo tests based on this definition are reported
in Section SM11. ATE estimates are very similar to the ones based on the more general definition
(see Table 4). Specifically, no effect is found on the probability to abandon PEC as main method
when signing off, but a positive effect is found on the probability to adopt it when signing off. Tests
for anticipatory effects show no evidence of anticipation. However, placebo tests reveal an anomalous
negative seasonal effect in 1995 for transitions to PEC associated to claim exit (P (C = 2,MPEC = 1)).
By re-estimating JSA ATEs without the 1995 cohort, the effect on P (C = 2,MPEC = 1) shrinks and
becomes insignificant with all comparison groups, suggesting that the estimated positive impact may
just reflect the anomalous fluctuation in 1995. Therefore, the most robust available evidence seems
to indicate that the JSA impact on P (C = 2,MPEC = 1) was null when PEC is considered as main
method. Remark that no deviations are observed when the more general definition is considered (see
Table SM11), therefore the positive impact on P (C = 2,MPEC = 1) appears a robust finding in this
case. The combined evidence on the two definitions suggests the following interpretation: on the one
hand, JSA did not induce claimants to abandon the use of PEC when leaving the register, either as
simple use or as main method; on the other hand, JSA significantly increased the share of leavers
newly adopting PEC, although not selecting it as main method.
Finally, the interpretation of the ATE on type (vi) transitions observed in Table 3 requires addi-
tional discussion. The interpretation is based on the assumption that JSA was neutral to the search
intensity in the status of non-claimant; therefore an increase in the search of leavers is attributed to
the loss of benefit. However if the assumption does not hold, an increase in type (vi) transitions may
simply reflect a positive JSA effect on the search of non-claimants. Section SM4 reports estimates of
JSA effects on the search intensity of non-claimants. Failure to observe significant effects supports
the validity of the assumption and hence the interpretation.
Another problem with the interpretation may be caused by reporting bias. For example, claimants
leaving the register may feel they need to convince the LFS interviewer they are highly search ac-
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tive. This over-reporting behaviour does not seem plausible for individuals ceasing claim voluntarily.
However, it might be possible if claiming is stopped because of a sanction. Since sanctioning rates
were rather low both before and after JSA (see Section 3), the extent of this possible reporting bias
appears negligible.
7. Concluding remarks
This paper has investigated the impact of job search related conditions on the search behaviour of
UI recipients. Exogenous variation arising by the introduction of the UK Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA)
has been used to identify the effect of stricter job search requirements. Previous impact evaluations
found that JSA moved off the claimant register many unemployed without reintegrating them to jobs.
Unlike existing studies analysing the impact of stricter conditionality, the present work has focused
on the differential impact on job search between claimants staying in the register (“stayers”) and
claimants leaving it without returning to work (“leavers”). A theoretical framework was presented to
assess possible intended and unintended effects of the policy distinguishing between a “moral hazard”
and a “liquidity” effect. This analysis aims to evaluate whether tighter conditionality can establish a
closer link between UI receipt and commitment to return to work.
Making use of Labour Force Survey data, JSA Average Treatment Effects (ATE) have been esti-
mated on two multinomial outcome variables, measuring the change in the intensity of search (∆s∗ R 0,
where s∗ is the number of search methods) and the switch in the use of the Public Employment Centre
(PEC) as search method (dismissal, adoption, stable use/non-use). These effects have been further
decomposed by stayers and leavers.
Results confirm that JSA increased remarkably the share of claimants leaving the register, in the
range of 5.3–5.8 percentage points, but had no impact on employment inflows. On the one hand,
JSA increased the share of unemployed keeping UI claim with higher search. This suggests that a
significant group of claimants adapted to the higher search requirements, in line with the intended
goal of mitigating moral hazard.
On the other hand, two opposite effects have been found for claimants leaving the UI pool. First,
JSA increased the share of claimants leaving the register with reduced search. Theoretical expectations
suggest that this group of workers are unlikely to be liquidity constrained and hence their search may
be influenced by a moral hazard component only. This result is considered an intended outcome
because these exits should be associated to decreased moral hazard costs without prejudice of the
consumption smoothing capacity of unemployed workers. Second, JSA increased also the share of
claimants leaving the register with increased search. Theory suggests that these individuals are likely
to be liquidity constrained, and hence they may be unable to absorb the income loss and be highly
motivated to look for a job. This effect is considered unintended because failure to insure committed
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jobseekers would lessen the UI insurance function. The hypothesised relation between change in search
intensity of leavers and liquidity status was largely supported by empirical checks.
The second impact is larger, accounting for a portion of the total claimant outflow in the range
of 38–45% against 24–28%. The substantial extra administrative hurdle introduced by the JSA may
have induced several jobseekers committed to get back into job to escape the monitoring of the
Benefit Agency, renouncing the UI coverage at the same time. This is consistent with evidence from
social experiments suggesting that mandatory re-employment services can be perceived by claimants
as threat of extra administrative burden, despite they are meant to support them. This threat
effect may be particularly strong for the JSA, which did not provide any further active job search
assistance service (Petrongolo, 2009). Moreover, since JSA increased search intensity of unemployed
people without increasing their job finding rate, it appears that JSA mainly enhanced the use of more
ineffective search channels. The rise in ineffective search might have been more pronounced for leavers,
because they increased search intensity by a larger amount. In addition, the null employment impact
for this category was found to persist even in the quarter following exit.
It was also found that JSA increased the share of claimants leaving the register and switching to
the use of the Public Employment Centre (PEC). Since monitoring and job search assistance services
were performed by functionally and physically separated offices at the time of the reform (McVicar,
2008), this finding suggests that stricter requirements may have induced several jobseekers to switch
from monitored to un-monitored search assistance services. Therefore it appears that the threat effect
of search requirements did not extend to services of the Employment Office. This may be interpreted
as a positive outcome of the policy given that more unemployed people were using dedicated support
services, possibly because they were perceived to be of some utility. However, in light of the null
employment impact of JSA, it also indicates that this method might have been ineffective for escaping
unemployment, especially for leavers. This interpretation is in line with evidence that PEC is often
ineffective for finding a job (see Holzer, 1988, inter alia). It is also consistent with evidence that stricter
monitoring redistributes search activities toward formal methods like PEC, possibly with no effect on
the job entry rate (Van den Berg and Van der Klaauw, 2006). Remark that no significant impact was
found on the switch rate when PEC was considered as the main search method; this suggests that
leavers were not dedicating the largest effort to PEC and hence other methods may have contributed
to the ineffectiveness of JSA.
In conclusion, the present evidence raises concerns about the success of search conditionality
policies in establishing a tighter link between benefit receipt and commitment to return to work.
While many claimants can enhance their search intensity to comply with higher requirements, at the
same time many unemployed individuals with liquidity constraints and hence motivated to re-enter
employment may abandon the UI system opting for un-subsidized search. The latter finding suggests
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that these policies can severely diminish the capacity of the UI to protect workers against the risk of
unemployment. This result adds up to a number of unintended consequences of search conditionality
already found in the literature, and points out an additional dimension to evaluate the welfare effect
of such policies (Cockx et al., 2014).
Finally, possible limitations of the analysis need to be mentioned. Two possible selection issues
may arise because search behaviour is not observed for exits to job. In fact, since this group may
possess better labour market characteristics, the resulting sample of consecutive jobseekers may be
negatively selected on employability. First, one should bear in mind that inference cannot be extended
to this population, possibly limiting the external validity of results presented in this paper. A second
selection issue can arise if the composition between treated and untreated groups becomes unbalanced
after eliminating those who have found a job. In the present case, this issue appears of minor concern
because the JSA treatment effect on employment inflows was found to be null. However, one cannot
exclude that the composition between those who found a job and those who did not was different
between treatment and control groups. This caveat should be taken in consideration when interpreting
findings in terms of causal effects. Third, the precision of the measurement approach to search
outcomes may be limited by discreteness of the search effort proxy and by non-homogeneity of search
methods. Such limitations may lead to over-representation of stable levels of search, since in some
cases the count of methods may remain unchanged even when effort actually changes. This issue could
be mitigated with availability of homogeneous indicators of search effort, such as the number of job
applications, or, more significantly, continuous indicators such as the time spent on search. Future
research is encouraged to deepen the understanding of welfare consequences of search conditionality
policies, taking the aforementioned issues into account.
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Supplemental Materials: Too much stick for the carrot? Job search
requirements and search behaviour of unemployment benefit claimants
SM1. Derivation of the relation between search intensity and search requirements
This Section discusses the derivation of the relation between optimal search intensity (s∗) and
search requirements (s) from the underlying first-order conditions. Fig. SM1 shows on the upper
part the curves r(s|yu) representing combinations between the reservation wage r and s∗ that satisfy
first-order conditions for given unemployment income yu, and on the lower part the relation between
s∗ and s. The graphical derivation of the curves r(s|yu) follows the analysis of Cockx et al. (2014,
see Fig. 1) for the case of an agent with exponential time preferences. In any point of r(s|yu) the
benefit of continuing search rather than accepting a job at the reservation wage is equal to the cost of
continued search in terms of effort and forgone employment income (see Cockx et al., 2014, eq. 11).
Such curves are hump-shaped and their maximum corresponds to (s, r) pairs where the second first-
order condition holds, i.e. marginal benefits and marginal costs of search are equal (see Cockx et al.,
2014, Proposition. 1). The net marginal return to search is a decreasing function of s for given r,
under the assumption of decreasing return in the job offer arrival rate and increasing marginal costs of
search. Therefore, marginal costs become greater (respectively lower) than marginal benefits moving
from the maximum to the right (respectively left) along the curves. Increments in the unemployment
income yu shift the curve upwards. UI recipients receive an unemployment income equal to yb, while
non-recipients receive a lower income equal to yz, which may not be necessarily equal to zero. Curves
corresponding to such levels are defined as r(s|yb) and r(s|yz), respectively, and reported in Fig. SM1.
In the absence of search requirements, the unemployed worker would be positioned on the max-
imum of the curve r(s|yb) in Fig. SM1, characterized by the pair (sL, r(sL)) (point EI). With the
introduction of search requirements, the unemployed worker would maintain the interior solution until
s = sL, for example in a point corresponding to s
′
. When the requirement increases from s
′
to s
′′
, the
optimal search effort increases from sL to the corner solution s
′′
, and the individual will move along
the curve r(s|yb) to the right of the maximum, that is in point EII . Further increases will be followed
by one-for-one increases in s until point EIII , where the claimant is indifferent between staying in
and ceasing claim with search intensity equal to sH (point E
IV ). Point EIII corresponds to the pair
(sc, r(sH)), where sc is formally defined by the following equality: r(sc|yb) = r(sH |yz). Note that the
lifetime utility is equivalent in EIII and in EIV , i.e. the maximum of the curve r(s|yz), because it is
proportional to the reservation wage (see Cockx et al., 2014, eq. 8). Any increase in the threshold from
below to above sc would lead to exit the claimant pool and to move to E
IV , where search intensity
is set equal to sH . The optimal search without claim (sH) is larger than the unconstrained optimal
search with claim (sL) because the relative price of leisure is larger in the first case.
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Figure SM1: Derivation of the relation between search intensity s∗ and search requirements s
 
 
 
r(s|yb) 
sH 
 
sL 
 
s’’’ 
 
sc 
 
s’ 
 
s’’ 
 
sH 
 
sL 
 
s 
 
s* 
 
r 
s* 
 
sc 
 
s’’’ 
 
sH 
 
s’’ 
 
sL 
 
r(sH) 
r(sL) 
 
r(s|yz) 
s’ 
 
EI 
EII 
EIII EIV 
SM2. Determinants of ∆s∗ for claimants exits to un-subsidized unemployment
This Section examines determinants of changes in search intensity (∆s∗) for claimants leaving the
register. Since the relation between search intensity (s∗) and requirements (s) depends only on the
three parameters sH , sL, and sc, variation in individual responses can be identified by changes in
these parameters. Fig. SM2 shows effects of tighter search requirements (s
′ → s′′) highlighting three
possible cases. Each case shows responses for two types of leavers with different values of sH (case
(1)), sL (case (2)), or sc (case (3)).
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Figure SM2: Tighter search requirements (s
′ → s′′) and change in search intensity of claim leavers.
Changes are compared between types of claimants with different values of sH , sL, or sc.
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In case (1) type I leaver (in black) has higher value of sH than type II leaver (in grey) (s
I
H > s
II
H ).
The graph shows that an increase in search requirements from s
′
to s
′′
leads both claimants to drop
off, but type I leaver will continue searching with higher intensity, while type II will reduce search.
In the example of the graph, an opposite change occurs because sIIH < s
′
< sIH , but other outcomes
may occur for other combinations of sIH and s
II
H . In general, a higher sH increases the probability of
leaving the claimant pool with increased search intensity relative to decreased search intensity.
In case (2), type I has lower sL implying that the first segment of the relation is shifted downward-
left along the 45◦ line. In the case illustrated in the graph, an increase in requirements from s
′
to
s
′′
leads both claimants to drop off with increased search, but type I leaver will perform a larger
increase. Note that as long as s
′
< sH , like in the graph, both claimants will perform an increase in
search intensity irrespective of the particular values of sIL and s
II
L . sL can only affect the size of the
increment when s
′
< sIIL , but sL becomes irrelevant when s
II
L ≤ s
′
< sH . When s
′ ≥ sH the two
relations are identical and hence sL is not relevant. Therefore while sL can influence the magnitude
of increments in search intensity in some cases, it has no impact on the probability of observing any
of the scenarios associated to claim exit in Table 1.
Finally, case (3) shows that variations in sc have no impact on the search intensity of leavers. sc
can only reduce the probability of leaving the claimant pool. For example, in case s
′′
< sIc , the reform
would lead type I claimants to keep claiming by adjusting search to higher standards. However note
that in this case sc does not influence search of leavers via sample selection, because in both periods
search intensity of type I claimant would be the same of leavers should s
′′
be above sIc .
The analysis conducted in Fig. 1 delivers a clear conclusion: the direction of change in search
intensity of leavers is only affected by the parameter sH , reflecting the optimal search intensity of an
unemployed person without benefit. Specifically, claimants with higher sH are more likely to drop off
with increased search relative to decreased search.
SM3. List of search methods
This section reports the list of possible search methods. Survey respondents who searched for a job
in the last four weeks can select any of the followings: (1) Visit a Jobcentre, (2) Visit a Careers office,
(3) Visit a Jobclub, (4) Have your name on the books of a private employment agency, (5) Advertise
for jobs in newspapers or journals, (6) Answer advertisements in newspapers and journals, (7) Study
situations vacant in newspapers or journals, (8) Apply directly to employers, (9) Ask friends, relatives,
colleagues or trade unions about jobs, (10) Wait for the results of an application for a job, (11) Look
for premises or equipment, (12) Seek any kind of permit, (13) Try to get a loan or other financial
backing for a job or business (14) Do anything else to find work. The search methods (1), (2), and (3)
have been considered for the analysis of transitions in the use of Public Employment Centre (PEC).
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SM4. JSA ATE on cardinal search intensity
This section reports estimates of the JSA effect on the cardinal change in the count of methods.
Table SM1 reports results for the sample of claimants in wave 1 remaining non-employed in wave 2.
Table SM2 considers unemployed non-claimants in wave 1 remaining non-claimants without job in
wave 2.
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Table SM1: JSA ATE on search intensity with alternative control years. Sample of claimants in
wave 1 remaining non-employed in wave 2.
Treatment = 96
94-95-97-98 95-97-98 94-95-97 95-97
Full sample
ATE 0.166∗ 0.140 0.195∗∗ 0.182∗
(0.073) (0.077) (0.074) (0.081)
Nobs 18418 13195 16230 11007
Stayers
ATE 0.158∗ 0.125 0.185∗ 0.160
(0.075) (0.079) (0.076) (0.082)
Nobs 15427 10976 13548 9097
Leavers
ATE 0.521∗ 0.505∗ 0.566∗∗ 0.571∗
(0.209) (0.224) (0.213) (0.236)
Nobs 2991 2219 2682 1910
Notes: *** significant 0.1%, ** significant 1%, * significant 5%. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. The
dependent variable is change in s∗ from wave 1 to wave 2. ATE is estimated by OLS. The following control variables
are used: gender, number of kids (< 19), age, age2, education, duration since last job, marriage status, region.
Table SM2: JSA ATE on search intensity with alternative control years. Sample of unemployed
non-claimants in wave 1 remaining non-claimants without job in wave 2.
Treatment = 96
94-95-97-98 95-97-98 94-95-97 95-97
ATE 0.132 0.128 0.102 0.082
(0.110) (0.114) (0.114) (0.121)
Nobs 10359 8164 8438 6243
Notes: *** significant 0.1%, ** significant 1%, * significant 5%. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. The
dependent variable is change in s∗ from wave 1 to wave 2. ATE is estimated by OLS. The following control variables
are used: gender, number of kids (< 19), age, age2, education, duration since last job, marriage status, region.
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SM5. Liquidity constraints and JSA effects
This section presents evidence on the impact of liquidity constraints on the claimant response
to JSA. Defining binary indicators for liquidity constraints, a Diff-in-diff-in-diff technique is used to
estimate the JSA Average Treatment Effects (ATE) for constrained claimants relative to unconstrained
claimants. The Diff-in-diff-in-diff is employed by augmenting eq. (2) with a full set of interaction terms
as follows:
β′Z = β0+β1 d96+β2 dq3q4+β3 d96·dq3q4+β4 L+β5 d96·L+β6 dq3q4·L+β7 d96·dq3q4·L+δ′X, (4)
where L indicates liquidity constrained (L = 1) and unconstrained (L = 0) claimants. The linear index
specified in eq. (4) is used to estimate a multinomial logit with J possible outcomes as in eq. (1). ATE
estimates are constructed using the following J · 8 probabilities:
P jt,q,l(X
◦) = P (y = j|d96 = t, dq3q4 = q, L = l,X = X◦), (5)
where t ∈ {0, 1}, q ∈ {0, 1}, and l ∈ {0, 1} determine the eight possible combinations of time,
treatment, and liquidity status in the Diff-in-diff-in-diff, j ∈ {1, . . . , J} represent possible outcomes,
and appropriate values are used forX◦. J Diff-in-diff-in-diff coefficients are identified asDiDiDj(X) =
[(P j1,1,1(X)−P j1,0,1(X))− (P j0,1,1(X)−P j0,0,1(X))]− [(P j1,1,0(X)−P j1,0,0(X))− (P j0,1,0(X)−P j0,0,0(X))],
where DiDiDj(X◦) is the JSA effect on the probability of experiencing transition j for liquidity
constrained claimants relative to unconstrained claimants.
Following Chetty (2008), liquidity constrains are proxied by two indicators for having to make
mortgage payments, and for single- versus dual-earner status. Chetty (2008) considers also asset
holding but unfortunately this information is not available in the present data. Sample statistics
for the two indicators are reported in Table SM3, similarly to Table 2. Note that the single- versus
dual-earner indicator is equal to 1 for married people whose spouse is non-employed as well as for
unmarried people. The Table reports also statistics for a third indicator defining liquidity constraints
by the co-occurrence of the two conditions, against the alternative of fulfilling only one or none of
them. This indicator takes into account that unemployed with mortgage obligations may not be
liquidity constrained if they have a working spouse, as well as unemployed without working spouse
in the absence of mortgage. Statistics show that among claimants in 1996q3, 31.6% hold a mortgage,
88.8% do not have a working spouse, and 25.2% hold a mortgager and are single earner at the
same time. Table SM3 shows that there are no significant deviations across treatment and time
status for any of these variables suggesting good balancing. Since nearly all claimants (95%) have
at least one constraint, and a relevant share is subject to even tighter constraints, it is possible that
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a substantial portion of the claimant population is liquidity constrained. One should bear in mind
that such constraints may be lessened by availability of liquid assets, and hence one cannot draw
definitive conclusions in the absence of such information. However, evidence typically shows that
many unemployed individuals have limited or no liquid wealth (Chetty, 2008). Moreover, in the
sample used in the present analysis claimants are relatively young (see Table 2), and hence they may
have accumulated limited liquid assets. Therefore it is likely that a relevant share of claimants are
unable to smooth transitory income losses, and hence may experience a drop in consumptions should
they leave benefit rolls.
Table SM4–SM6 report ATE estimates for outcome variables specified like in Table 3, considering
as indicators for liquidity constraints, respectively, holding a mortgage, single earner status, or fulfilling
both conditions at the same time. Reported ATEs capture the difference in the JSA impact on the
specified probability between constrained and unconstrained claimants.
Table SM3: Sample statistics for claimants in 1996q3 and Difference-in-differences in variable means
calculated comparing between q3 and q2 and between 1996 and control years. *** significant 0.1%,
** significant 1%, * significant 5%. Standard errors in parenthesis.
96 94-95-97-98 95-97-98 94-95-97 95-97
mean se DiD se DiD se DiD se DiD se
Mortgager 0.316 (0.465) 0.010 (0.015) 0.007 (0.016) 0.010 (0.015) 0.006 (0.017)
Single earner 0.888 (0.316) 0.006 (0.010) 0.010 (0.011) 0.006 (0.011) 0.010 (0.012)
Both constraints 0.252 (0.434) 0.017 (0.014) 0.016 (0.015) 0.016 (0.014) 0.013 (0.015)
Nobs 2376 17652 11401 14953 8702
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Table SM4: JSA ATE on claimant behaviour with alternative control groups. ATE refers to liquidity
constrained vs unconstrained claimants. Constraints are defined by having a mortgage
Treatment = 96
94-95-97-98 95-97-98 94-95-97 95-97
(a) C
P (C = 1) −0.026 −0.021 −0.033 −0.034
(0.031) (0.034) (0.032) (0.035)
P (C = 2) −0.031 −0.034 −0.027 −0.025
(0.023) (0.025) (0.024) (0.027)
P (C = 3) 0.057∗ 0.055∗ 0.060∗ 0.059∗
(0.024) (0.026) (0.025) (0.027)
(b) ∆s∗
P ?(∆s∗ < 0) −0.087∗∗ −0.092∗∗ −0.082∗∗ −0.086∗∗
(0.029) (0.031) (0.029) (0.032)
P ?(∆s∗ = 0) −0.025 −0.025 −0.022 −0.021
(0.036) (0.038) (0.036) (0.039)
P ?(∆s∗ > 0) 0.053 0.060 0.043 0.045
(0.029) (0.031) (0.030) (0.033)
P (C = 3) 0.059∗ 0.057∗ 0.061∗ 0.061∗
(0.024) (0.026) (0.025) (0.027)
(c) (C,∆s∗)
P (C = 1,∆s∗ < 0) −0.058∗ −0.062∗ −0.054∗ −0.058∗
(0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.029)
P (C = 1,∆s∗ = 0) 0.005 0.010 0.004 0.008
(0.035) (0.037) (0.036) (0.039)
P (C = 1,∆s∗ > 0) 0.025 0.030 0.015 0.014
(0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.031)
P (C = 2,∆s∗ < 0) −0.034∗ −0.035∗ −0.032∗ −0.032∗
(0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.017)
P (C = 2,∆s∗ = 0) −0.024 −0.029 −0.022 −0.025
(0.017) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020)
P (C = 2,∆s∗ > 0) 0.028∗ 0.031∗ 0.029∗ 0.034∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015)
P (C = 3) 0.058∗ 0.055∗ 0.060∗ 0.059∗
(0.024) (0.026) (0.025) (0.027)
Nobs 22364 16113 19665 13414
Notes: *** significant 0.1%, ** significant 1%, * significant 5%. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
P ?(·) := P (·|C ∈ {1, 2}). The outcome variables (a), (b) and (c) make use of the variables C and ∆s∗. C identifies
transitions from claimant status in wave 1 as follows: C = 1 if still non-employed and claimant in wave 2, C = 2 if
still non-employed but no longer claimant, C = 3 if employed. ∆s∗ is an indicator of change in job search intensity
(∆s∗ R 0) between wave 1 and wave 2. Reported ATEs are computed from multinomial logit models with Diff-in-diff-
diff specification and correspond to changes in the probability of performing the specified transition for constrained vs
unconstrained claimants. The following control variables are used: gender, number of kids (< 19), age, age2, education,
duration since last job, marriage status, region.
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Table SM5: JSA ATE on claimant behaviour with alternative control groups. ATE refers to liquidity
constrained vs unconstrained claimants. Constraints are defined by not having a working spouse
Treatment = 96
94-95-97-98 95-97-98 94-95-97 95-97
(a) C
P (C = 1) −0.084∗ −0.098∗ −0.071 −0.079
(0.042) (0.046) (0.043) (0.048)
P (C = 2) 0.025 0.032 0.020 0.028
(0.030) (0.033) (0.032) (0.036)
P (C = 3) 0.059 0.065 0.050 0.051
(0.032) (0.035) (0.033) (0.036)
(b) ∆s∗
P ?(∆s∗ < 0) −0.060 −0.082 −0.056 −0.080
(0.040) (0.042) (0.041) (0.044)
P ?(∆s∗ = 0) −0.056 −0.050 −0.055 −0.045
(0.051) (0.054) (0.052) (0.056)
P ?(∆s∗ > 0) 0.056 0.067 0.060 0.074
(0.042) (0.044) (0.043) (0.046)
P (C = 3) 0.060 0.065 0.051 0.051
(0.032) (0.035) (0.032) (0.036)
(c) (C,∆s∗)
P (C = 1,∆s∗ < 0) −0.026 −0.043 −0.025 −0.044
(0.037) (0.039) (0.038) (0.041)
P (C = 1,∆s∗ = 0) −0.081 −0.093 −0.072 −0.081
(0.052) (0.055) (0.053) (0.057)
P (C = 1,∆s∗ > 0) 0.018 0.032 0.022 0.039
(0.041) (0.043) (0.041) (0.044)
P (C = 2,∆s∗ < 0) −0.025 −0.030 −0.023 −0.028
(0.019) (0.021) (0.019) (0.022)
P (C = 2,∆s∗ = 0) 0.018 0.033 0.011 0.029
(0.022) (0.024) (0.024) (0.027)
P (C = 2,∆s∗ > 0) 0.035∗ 0.035∗ 0.035∗ 0.035∗
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017)
P (C = 3) 0.060 0.066 0.051 0.051
(0.032) (0.035) (0.033) (0.036)
Nobs 22364 16113 19665 13414
Notes: *** significant 0.1%, ** significant 1%, * significant 5%. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
P ?(·) := P (·|C ∈ {1, 2}). The outcome variables (a), (b) and (c) make use of the variables C and ∆s∗. C identifies
transitions from claimant status in wave 1 as follows: C = 1 if still non-employed and claimant in wave 2, C = 2 if
still non-employed but no longer claimant, C = 3 if employed. ∆s∗ is an indicator of change in job search intensity
(∆s∗ R 0) between wave 1 and wave 2. Reported ATEs are computed from multinomial logit models with Diff-in-diff-
diff specification and correspond to changes in the probability of performing the specified transition for constrained vs
unconstrained claimants. The following control variables are used: gender, number of kids (< 19), age, age2, education,
duration since last job, marriage status, region.
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Table SM6: JSA ATE on claimant behaviour with alternative control groups. ATE refers to liquidity
constrained vs unconstrained claimants. Constraints are defined by having a mortgage and not having
a working spouse
Treatment = 96
94-95-97-98 95-97-98 94-95-97 95-97
(a) C
P (C = 1) −0.061 −0.063 −0.061 −0.065
(0.034) (0.037) (0.035) (0.039)
P (C = 2) −0.032 −0.030 −0.027 −0.021
(0.026) (0.028) (0.027) (0.030)
P (C = 3) 0.093∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗ 0.088∗∗ 0.085∗∗
(0.026) (0.028) (0.027) (0.029)
(b) ∆s∗
P ?(∆s∗ < 0) −0.095∗∗ −0.107∗∗ −0.086∗∗ −0.097∗∗
(0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.035)
P ?(∆s∗ = 0) −0.058 −0.060 −0.050 −0.048
(0.039) (0.041) (0.040) (0.043)
P ?(∆s∗ > 0) 0.057 0.071∗ 0.046 0.057
(0.032) (0.034) (0.033) (0.035)
P (C = 3) 0.096∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗
(0.026) (0.028) (0.027) (0.029)
(c) (C,∆s∗)
P (C = 1,∆s∗ < 0) −0.059∗ −0.069∗ −0.053 −0.062∗
(0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031)
P (C = 1,∆s∗ = 0) −0.025 −0.030 −0.020 −0.024
(0.039) (0.041) (0.039) (0.043)
P (C = 1,∆s∗ > 0) 0.026 0.039 0.015 0.024
(0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.034)
P (C = 2,∆s∗ < 0) −0.039∗ −0.042∗ −0.037∗ −0.040∗
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018)
P (C = 2,∆s∗ = 0) −0.025 −0.022 −0.023 −0.017
(0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023)
P (C = 2,∆s∗ > 0) 0.028∗ 0.030∗ 0.029∗ 0.033∗
(0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016)
P (C = 3) 0.094∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗
(0.026) (0.028) (0.027) (0.030)
Nobs 22364 16113 19665 13414
Notes: *** significant 0.1%, ** significant 1%, * significant 5%. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
P ?(·) := P (·|C ∈ {1, 2}). The outcome variables (a), (b) and (c) make use of the variables C and ∆s∗. C identifies
transitions from claimant status in wave 1 as follows: C = 1 if still non-employed and claimant in wave 2, C = 2 if
still non-employed but no longer claimant, C = 3 if employed. ∆s∗ is an indicator of change in job search intensity
(∆s∗ R 0) between wave 1 and wave 2. Reported ATEs are computed from multinomial logit models with Diff-in-diff-
diff specification and correspond to changes in the probability of performing the specified transition for constrained vs
unconstrained claimants. The following control variables are used: gender, number of kids (< 19), age, age2, education,
duration since last job, marriage status, region.
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SM6. Multinomial logit estimates
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SM7. Tests for anticipatory effects
Table SM8 and Table SM9 report tests for the presence of JSA anticipatory effects in ATE estimates
reported in Table 3 and Table 4, respectively. Claimant flows between q2 and q3 are considered as a
treatment group in these tests, and they are compared to transitions between q1 and q2 and across
years to implement a Diff-in-diff strategy.
In interpreting results one should bear in mind that estimated ATEs must sum up to zero, and
hence each of them is compensated by other effects reflecting the same behavioural change. The
following outcomes are considered counterparts since they do not reflect behavioural change per se:
P (C = 1) in panel (a); P (∆s∗ = 0) in panel (b); P (C = ·,∆s∗ = 0) in panel (c). According to this
definition, there are 32 relevant ATEs in Table SM8, of which none is significant. Following a similar
argument, the following outcomes are considered counterparts in Table SM9: P (MPEC = 0) in panel
(d); P (C = ·,MPEC = 0) in panel (e). Hence, there are 24 relevant coefficients in Table SM9. No
evidence of anticipatory effects is found in these cases either.
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Table SM8: JSA ATE on claimant behaviour with alternative control years. Tests for anticipatory
effects. The treatment group comprises flows from q2 to q3, and the control group flows from q1 to
q2.
Treatment = 96
94-95-97-98 95-97-98 94-95-97 95-97
(a) C
P (C = 1) −0.003 −0.016 0.013 0.006
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016)
P (C = 2) 0.013 0.020 0.003 0.006
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
P (C = 3) −0.010 −0.004 −0.016 −0.012
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
(b) ∆s∗
P ?(∆s∗ < 0) 0.019 0.007 0.018 0.003
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
P ?(∆s∗ = 0) 0.012 0.018 0.022 0.037∗
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017)
P ?(∆s∗ > 0) −0.021 −0.020 −0.025 −0.027
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
P (C = 3) −0.010 −0.005 −0.016 −0.012
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
(c) (C,∆s∗)
P (C = 1,∆s∗ < 0) 0.010 −0.002 0.012 −0.002
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
P (C = 1,∆s∗ = 0) 0.009 0.008 0.025 0.034∗
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017)
P (C = 1,∆s∗ > 0) −0.022 −0.022 −0.024 −0.026
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
P (C = 2,∆s∗ < 0) 0.009 0.009 0.006 0.004
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
P (C = 2,∆s∗ = 0) 0.003 0.010 −0.003 0.003
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
P (C = 2,∆s∗ > 0) 0.001 0.002 −0.000 −0.000
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
P (C = 3) −0.010 −0.005 −0.016 −0.012
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
Nobs 23530 16966 20846 14282
Notes: *** significant 0.1%, ** significant 1%, * significant 5%. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
See Table 3.
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Table SM9: JSA ATE on use of PEC with alternative control years. Tests for anticipatory effects.
The treatment group comprises flows from q2 to q3, and the control group flows from q1 to q2.
Treatment = 96
94-95-97-98 95-97-98 94-95-97 95-97
(d) MPEC
P ?(MPEC = −1) 0.010 0.000 0.013 0.002
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
P ?(MPEC = 1) −0.007 −0.005 −0.007 −0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
P ?(MPEC = 0) 0.007 0.011 0.009 0.015
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
P (C = 3) −0.011 −0.006 −0.015 −0.011
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
(e) (MPEC , C)
P (C = 1,MPEC = −1) 0.002 −0.004 0.006 0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
P (C = 1,MPEC = 1) −0.005 −0.003 −0.004 −0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
P (C = 1,MPEC = 0) 0.009 0.000 0.025 0.024
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017)
P (C = 2,MPEC = −1) 0.009 0.006 0.008 0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
P (C = 2,MPEC = 1) −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
P (C = 2,MPEC = 0) −0.001 0.011 −0.016 −0.010
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
P (C = 3) −0.011 −0.006 −0.016 −0.011
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
Nobs 23467 16930 20727 14190
Notes: *** significant 0.1%, ** significant 1%, * significant 5%. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
See Table 4.
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SM8. Placebo tests
Tables SM10–SM11 report falsification tests on “placebo” JSA reforms. The outcomes in these
Tables correspond to the ones in Table 3 and Table 4 in the main text, respectively. The tests are
based on the same sample used in estimation with the exclusion of 1996, the year JSA was introduced.
Years used to form the control group, namely 1994, 1995, 1997 and 1998, are considered in turn as
the treatment group in the placebo tests, using the remaining years as control group. Each column of
Tables SM10–SM11 hence report tests on the equality of seasonal effects between the focal year and
the remaining years.
In Table SM10, significant seasonal effects are found for P (C = 1,∆s∗ < 0) (panel (c)) in 1994 and
1995, with positive and negative sign respectively. These effects are similarly reflected in coefficients for
P ∗(∆s∗ < 0) in panel (b) and for P (C = 1) in panel (a). However, results reported in Table 3 show that
treatment effects estimated for these outcomes are somewhat stable across alternative combinations of
comparison years in terms of sign, magnitude and significance. Therefore, results are only marginally
influenced by such yearly fluctuations, and main conclusions are not affected qualitatively. Moreover
remark that no significant effects are found for any outcome of leavers (P (C = 2)).
In Table SM11, significant effects are found only for P (C = 1,MPEC = 0) (panel (e)) in 1994, and
for P (C = 3) in 1995. In the first case, since the outcome P (C = 1,MPEC = 0) is not associated to
a behavioural change, and no other significant effects are found in the model, there does not appear
to be any relevant change in behaviour in this year (see also the discussion in Section SM7). In the
second case, a positive effect on P (C = 3) for 1995 suggests an unusual employment inflow associated
to transitions between q3 and q4 relatively to transitions between q2 and q3. However, evidence for
this seasonal effect appears quite weak since the coefficient is only marginally significant, and the effect
on P (C = 3) turns out to be insignificant in panel (a), (b), and (c) in Table SM10. Moreover the
estimated JSA impacts on P (C = 3) reported in Tables 3 and 4 are never close to significance, even
when 1995 and 1997 are used alone as comparison group, suggesting that treatment effect estimation
is not influenced significantly. Therefore, this yearly fluctuation does not appear to challenge the well
established conclusion of a null employment impact of JSA. Remark that no significant effects are
found for any outcome of leavers even in this Table.
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Table SM10: JSA ATE on claimant behaviour with alternative control years. Placebo tests.
Treatment = 94 95 97 98
95-97-98 94-97-98 94-95-98 94-95-97
(a) C
P (C = 1) 0.030∗ −0.017 −0.013 −0.011
(0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.019)
P (C = 2) −0.008 −0.007 0.014 0.010
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.014)
P (C = 3) −0.021 0.023 −0.001 0.001
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015)
(b) ∆s∗
P ?(∆s∗ < 0) 0.031∗ −0.032∗ 0.022 −0.028
(0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.017)
P ?(∆s∗ = 0) 0.004 0.006 −0.009 −0.008
(0.015) (0.016) (0.019) (0.020)
P ?(∆s∗ > 0) −0.014 0.003 −0.012 0.034
(0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.018)
P (C = 3) −0.021 0.023 −0.001 0.001
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015)
(c) (C,∆s∗)
P (C = 1,∆s∗ < 0) 0.029∗ −0.025∗ 0.017 −0.029
(0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.016)
P (C = 1,∆s∗ = 0) 0.015 −0.001 −0.009 −0.015
(0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.020)
P (C = 1,∆s∗ > 0) −0.015 0.010 −0.020 0.033
(0.012) (0.013) (0.016) (0.017)
P (C = 2,∆s∗ < 0) 0.002 −0.006 0.005 0.000
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
P (C = 2,∆s∗ = 0) −0.011 0.007 0.001 0.008
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010)
P (C = 2,∆s∗ > 0) 0.001 −0.008 0.007 0.001
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
P (C = 3) −0.022 0.023 −0.000 0.001
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015)
Nobs 17670 17670 17670 17670
Notes: *** significant 0.1%, ** significant 1%, * significant 5%. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
See Table 3 for estimates with the actual treatment group.
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Table SM11: JSA ATE on use of PEC with alternative control years. Placebo tests.
Treatment = 94 95 97 98
95-97-98 94-97-98 94-95-98 94-95-97
(d) MPEC
P ?(MPEC = −1) 0.006 −0.012 0.018 −0.014
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011)
P ?(MPEC = 1) −0.006 0.000 0.003 0.009
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010)
P ?(MPEC = 0) 0.020 −0.012 −0.020 0.007
(0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.019)
P (C = 3) −0.021 0.024∗ −0.001 −0.002
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015)
(e) (MPEC , C)
P (C = 1,MPEC = −1) 0.007 −0.007 0.011 −0.014
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009)
P (C = 1,MPEC = 1) −0.009 0.003 0.000 0.013
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009)
P (C = 1,MPEC = 0) 0.031
∗ −0.014 −0.022 −0.005
(0.015) (0.016) (0.019) (0.020)
P (C = 2,MPEC = −1) 0.000 −0.005 0.005 −0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
P (C = 2,MPEC = 1) 0.003 −0.003 0.002 −0.007
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005)
P (C = 2,MPEC = 0) −0.012 0.002 0.003 0.015
(0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012)
P (C = 3) −0.021 0.024∗ −0.000 −0.001
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015)
Nobs 17598 17598 17598 17598
Notes: *** significant 0.1%, ** significant 1%, * significant 5%. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
See Table 4 for estimates with the actual treatment group.
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SM9. Estimates without control variables
Table SM12: JSA ATE on claimant behaviour with alternative control years. No control variables
Treatment = 96
94-95-97-98 95-97-98 94-95-97 95-97
(a) C
P (C = 1) −0.072∗∗∗ −0.063∗∗∗ −0.075∗∗∗ −0.064∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017)
P (C = 2) 0.055∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
P (C = 3) 0.018 0.010 0.018 0.008
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
(b) ∆s∗
P ?(∆s∗ < 0) −0.018 −0.008 −0.023 −0.012
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
P ?(∆s∗ = 0) −0.028 −0.026 −0.030 −0.028
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018)
P ?(∆s∗ > 0) 0.031∗ 0.026 0.037∗∗ 0.034∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
P (C = 3) 0.015 0.008 0.016 0.006
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
(c) (C,∆s∗)
P (C = 1,∆s∗ < 0) −0.033∗∗ −0.023 −0.038∗∗ −0.028∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
P (C = 1,∆s∗ = 0) −0.049∗∗ −0.043∗∗ −0.052∗∗ −0.046∗∗
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017)
P (C = 1,∆s∗ > 0) 0.009 0.003 0.014 0.009
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
P (C = 2,∆s∗ < 0) 0.014∗ 0.015∗ 0.014∗ 0.015∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
P (C = 2,∆s∗ = 0) 0.019∗ 0.015 0.021∗∗ 0.016
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
P (C = 2,∆s∗ > 0) 0.022∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
P (C = 3) 0.018 0.010 0.018 0.008
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
Nobs 22399 16148 19697 13446
Notes: *** significant 0.1%, ** significant 1%, * significant 5%. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
See Table 3.
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Table SM13: JSA ATE on use of PEC with alternative control years. No control variables
Treatment = 96
94-95-97-98 95-97-98 94-95-97 95-97
(d) MPEC
P ?(MPEC = −1) −0.007 −0.005 −0.009 −0.008
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
P ?(MPEC = 1) 0.012 0.009 0.013 0.011
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
P ?(MPEC = 0) −0.021 −0.014 −0.020 −0.010
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017)
P (C = 3) 0.016 0.009 0.016 0.007
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
(e) (MPEC , C)
P (C = 1,MPEC = −1) −0.011 −0.008 −0.013 −0.011
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
P (C = 1,MPEC = 1) 0.003 −0.000 0.005 0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
P (C = 1,MPEC = 0) −0.066∗∗∗ −0.056∗∗∗ −0.068∗∗∗ −0.056∗∗
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018)
P (C = 2,MPEC = −1) 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
P (C = 2,MPEC = 1) 0.008
∗∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.010∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
P (C = 2,MPEC = 0) 0.043
∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
P (C = 3) 0.018 0.011 0.018 0.008
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
Nobs 22310 16092 19617 13399
Notes: *** significant 0.1%, ** significant 1%, * significant 5%. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
See Table 4
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SM10. Estimates after deleting claimants on New Deal in 1998
Table SM14: JSA ATE on claimant behaviour with alternative control years. A small number of
individuals on New Deal in 1998 have been dropped.
Treatment = 96
94-95-97-98 95-97-98 94-95-97 95-97
(a) C
P (C = 1) −0.075∗∗∗ −0.066∗∗∗ −0.076∗∗∗ −0.065∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
P (C = 2) 0.055∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
P (C = 3) 0.020 0.013 0.019 0.009
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
(b) ∆s∗
P ?(∆s∗ < 0) −0.019 −0.008 −0.024 −0.013
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
P ?(∆s∗ = 0) −0.029 −0.027 −0.029 −0.028
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017)
P ?(∆s∗ > 0) 0.031∗ 0.025 0.037∗∗ 0.034∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
P (C = 3) 0.017 0.011 0.017 0.007
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
(c) (C,∆s∗)
P (C = 1,∆s∗ < 0) −0.034∗∗ −0.024 −0.039∗∗ −0.029∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
P (C = 1,∆s∗ = 0) −0.050∗∗ −0.045∗∗ −0.052∗∗ −0.046∗∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017)
P (C = 1,∆s∗ > 0) 0.008 0.002 0.014 0.009
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
P (C = 2,∆s∗ < 0) 0.014∗ 0.016∗ 0.014∗ 0.016∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
P (C = 2,∆s∗ = 0) 0.020∗∗ 0.015 0.022∗∗ 0.017∗
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
P (C = 2,∆s∗ > 0) 0.022∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
P (C = 3) 0.020 0.013 0.019 0.009
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
Nobs 22310 16059 19697 13446
Notes: *** significant 0.1%, ** significant 1%, * significant 5%. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
See Table 3.
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Table SM15: JSA ATE on use of PEC with alternative control years. A small number of individuals
on New Deal in 1998 have been dropped.
Treatment = 96
94-95-97-98 95-97-98 94-95-97 95-97
(d) MPEC
P ?(MPEC = −1) −0.006 −0.003 −0.009 −0.008
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
P ?(MPEC = 1) 0.012 0.010 0.013 0.011
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
P ?(MPEC = 0) −0.024 −0.018 −0.021 −0.012
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
P (C = 3) 0.018 0.012 0.017 0.008
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
(e) (MPEC , C)
P (C = 1,MPEC = −1) −0.010 −0.007 −0.013 −0.011
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
P (C = 1,MPEC = 1) 0.003 0.000 0.005 0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
P (C = 1,MPEC = 0) −0.069∗∗∗ −0.061∗∗∗ −0.069∗∗∗ −0.058∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017)
P (C = 2,MPEC = −1) 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
P (C = 2,MPEC = 1) 0.008
∗∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.010∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
P (C = 2,MPEC = 0) 0.044
∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011)
P (C = 3) 0.021 0.014 0.019 0.009
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
Nobs 22221 16003 19617 13399
Notes: *** significant 0.1%, ** significant 1%, * significant 5%. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
See Table 4
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SM11. JSA ATE on the use of PEC as main method
This Section reports complementary evidence with respect to estimates in Table 4, considering a
more restrictive definition of use of PEC; namely whether PEC is used as main method of search. In
this case an inflow (respectively outflow from) to PEC corresponds to a transition from non-use or
from use as non-main method (respectively use as main method) in wave 1 to use as main method
(respectively non-use or use as non-main method) in wave 2. Table SM16 reports estimates of the
JSA ATEs based on this definition, showing very similar results to the ones reported in Table 4.
Table SM17 and Table SM18 report tests for anticipatory and placebo effects respectively. Fol-
lowing the discussion in Section SM7, there is no evidence of JSA anticipatory effects in Table SM17.
Placebo tests in Table SM18 show a limited set of significant coefficients. Beyond P (C = 3) and
counterpart effects already discussed in Section SM8, two significant effects in Table SM18 require
discussion. First, a negative effect for P (C = 1,MPEC = 1) in 1994 indicates that in this year PEC
inflows of stayers have been unusually low between q3 and q4 relatively to between q2 and q3. Results
in Table SM16 show that the estimated JSA effect on this outcome is not significant for any of the
alternative control groups, not even when 1994 is omitted, suggesting that this result appears robust
to the anomalous flows in 1994.
Second, a negative coefficient of −1.1% is found for P (C = 2,MPEC = 1) in 1995, indicating that
relative PEC inflows for leavers were unusually low in this year. The corresponding JSA ATE reported
in Table SM16 is positive and significant in the range of 0.8–1.1%. Since the two effects are similar
in magnitude and all control groups in Table SM16 include 1995, it is possible that the estimated
positive ATE is driven by the anomalous fluctuation in 1995 and hence it does not capture a policy
effect. In fact, by re-estimating the models without the 1995 cohort, it turns out that the ATE shrinks
and loses significance with all comparison groups. Therefore, the most robust available evidence seems
to indicate that the JSA impact on P (C = 2,MPEC = 1) was null when this specific definition of
PEC use is considered. Remark that this seasonal effect is not observed for PEC transitions based on
the more general definition (see Table SM11), therefore the JSA impact on P (C = 2,MPEC = 1) is
robust in this case.
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Table SM16: JSA ATE on use of PEC (as main method) with alternative control years.
Treatment = 96
94-95-97-98 95-97-98 94-95-97 95-97
(d) MPEC
P ?(MPEC = −1) 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.001
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
P ?(MPEC = 1) 0.004 −0.001 0.006 0.001
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
P ?(MPEC = 0) −0.027 −0.013 −0.027 −0.010
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017)
P (C = 3) 0.017 0.011 0.017 0.008
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
(e) (MPEC , C)
P (C = 1,MPEC = −1) 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.001
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
P (C = 1,MPEC = 1) −0.005 −0.011 −0.003 −0.009
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
P (C = 1,MPEC = 0) −0.075∗∗∗ −0.060∗∗∗ −0.077∗∗∗ −0.057∗∗
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018)
P (C = 2,MPEC = −1) 0.001 −0.000 0.002 0.001
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
P (C = 2,MPEC = 1) 0.008
∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.011∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
P (C = 2,MPEC = 0) 0.046
∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
P (C = 3) 0.020 0.013 0.019 0.009
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
Nobs 22310 16092 19617 13399
Notes: *** significant 0.1%, ** significant 1%, * significant 5%. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
P ?(·) := P (·|C ∈ {1, 2}). The outcome variables (d) and (e) make use of the variables C and MPEC . C identifies
transitions from claimant status in wave 1 as follows: C = 1 if still non-employed and claimant in wave 2, C = 2 if still
non-employed but no longer claimant, C = 3 if employed. MPEC identifies transitions involving the search method
PEC as main method for claimants in wave 1, such as abandoning PEC (MPEC = −1) as main method in wave 2,
adopting PEC (MPEC = 1) as main method in wave 2, or consistently using or not PEC as main method in both
waves (MPEC = 0). Reported ATEs are computed from multinomial logit models with Diff-in-diff specification and
correspond to changes in the probability of performing the specified transition. The following control variables are used
in the multinomial logit specification: gender, number of kids (< 19), age, age2, education, duration since last job,
marriage status, region. See Table 2 for descriptive statistics.
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Table SM17: JSA ATE on use of PEC (as main method) with alternative control years. Tests for
anticipatory effects. The treatment group comprises flows from q2 to q3, and the control group flows
from q1 to q2.
Treatment = 96
94-95-97-98 95-97-98 94-95-97 95-97
(d) MPEC
P ?(MPEC = −1) −0.001 −0.001 −0.000 0.001
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
P ?(MPEC = 1) −0.013 −0.011 −0.014 −0.013
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
P ?(MPEC = 0) 0.025 0.017 0.029
∗ 0.023
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
P (C = 3) −0.011 −0.006 −0.015 −0.012
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
(e) (MPEC , C)
P (C = 1,MPEC = −1) −0.004 −0.003 −0.001 0.001
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
P (C = 1,MPEC = 1) −0.011 −0.007 −0.012 −0.008
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
P (C = 1,MPEC = 0) 0.022 0.004 0.041
∗∗ 0.032
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017)
P (C = 2,MPEC = −1) 0.003 0.002 0.001 −0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
P (C = 2,MPEC = 1) −0.002 −0.004 −0.003 −0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
P (C = 2,MPEC = 0) 0.003 0.014 −0.011 −0.008
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
P (C = 3) −0.011 −0.006 −0.015 −0.011
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
Nobs 23467 16930 20727 14190
Notes: *** significant 0.1%, ** significant 1%, * significant 5%. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
See Table SM16.
26
Table SM18: JSA ATE on use of PEC (as main method) with alternative control years. Placebo
tests.
Treatment = 94 95 97 98
95-97-98 94-97-98 94-95-98 94-95-97
(d) MPEC
P ?(MPEC = −1) −0.005 0.001 0.011 −0.005
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011)
P ?(MPEC = 1) −0.013 −0.000 0.010 0.012
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010)
P ?(MPEC = 0) 0.038
∗∗ −0.024 −0.019 −0.005
(0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.019)
P (C = 3) −0.020 0.024∗ −0.001 −0.002
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015)
(e) (MPEC , C)
P (C = 1,MPEC = −1) 0.001 0.002 0.007 −0.012
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010)
P (C = 1,MPEC = 1) −0.017∗ 0.008 0.004 0.011
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010)
P (C = 1,MPEC = 0) 0.045
∗∗ −0.027 −0.023 −0.006
(0.015) (0.016) (0.019) (0.021)
P (C = 2,MPEC = −1) −0.005 −0.002 0.003 0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
P (C = 2,MPEC = 1) 0.004 −0.010∗∗ 0.005 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
P (C = 2,MPEC = 0) −0.007 0.004 0.005 0.001
(0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013)
P (C = 3) −0.021 0.024∗ −0.000 −0.001
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015)
Nobs 17598 17598 17598 17598
Notes: *** significant 0.1%, ** significant 1%, * significant 5%. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
See Table SM16 for estimates with the actual treatment group.
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SM12. Attrition
Table SM19 reports attrition rates and average characteristics of attriters and non-attriters for 1996
and alternative control years. All years include treated and untreated claimants together (q3 and q2).
The Table shows that 29.1% of claimants in 1996q3 and 1996q2 are not observed in the subsequent
quarters. ∼ 20% of this group are individuals at the last interview, while the remaining share reflects
non-responses. Non-responses comprise individuals not present at the previous wave address because
of move or temporary absence. Attrition may introduce bias if differences between attriters and non-
attriters are systematically related to the treatment status. This issue is investigated in Table SM20.
The Table reports in the first column the Diff-in-diff in variable means calculated between attriters
and non-attriters and between treated and untreated unemployed claimants for 1996. This statistic
is not significant for any of the variables hence showing no evidence of attrition bias for 1996. The
following columns report the Diff-in-diff-in-diff statistics computed comparing the Diff-in-diff between
1996 and alternative control years. The statistics are never significantly different from zero for any
of the control group and for any of the variables. This evidence strongly suggests that differences
between attriters and non-attriters are not systematically related to the treatment status.
Table SM19: Attrition statistics by treatment and control years. All unemployed claimants in q2
and q3.
96 94-95-97-98 95-97-98 94-95-97 95-97
Attrition 0.291 0.293 0.295 0.295 0.298
(0.454) (0.455) (0.456) (0.456) (0.457)
yes no yes no yes no yes no yes no
Female 0.276 0.262 0.270 0.261 0.262 0.253 0.277 0.265 0.273 0.258
(0.447) (0.440) (0.444) (0.439) (0.440) (0.434) (0.448) (0.442) (0.445) (0.438)
Age 33.664 35.391 33.569 35.611 33.696 35.794 33.287 35.499 33.260 35.663
(12.357)(12.375)(12.562)(12.722)(12.588)(12.780)(12.364)(12.621)(12.266)(12.629)
Married 0.285 0.314 0.282 0.333 0.267 0.319 0.287 0.343 0.271 0.331
(0.452) (0.464) (0.450) (0.471) (0.443) (0.466) (0.453) (0.475) (0.445) (0.471)
Nr. kids 0—18 yrs 0.682 0.695 0.654 0.697 0.641 0.682 0.660 0.714 0.647 0.707
(1.156) (1.131) (1.127) (1.149) (1.110) (1.150) (1.128) (1.154) (1.107) (1.160)
s∗ 4.320 4.355 4.328 4.319 4.436 4.447 4.306 4.299 4.431 4.453
(2.475) (2.458) (2.483) (2.424) (2.498) (2.416) (2.486) (2.429) (2.508) (2.422)
methPEC 0.766 0.776 0.773 0.786 0.790 0.802 0.768 0.780 0.785 0.797
(0.423) (0.417) (0.419) (0.410) (0.407) (0.398) (0.422) (0.414) (0.411) (0.402)
Degree or equiv. 0.091 0.085 0.082 0.074 0.085 0.078 0.082 0.072 0.088 0.076
(0.288) (0.279) (0.274) (0.262) (0.280) (0.268) (0.275) (0.259) (0.283) (0.265)
Higher education 0.043 0.047 0.042 0.042 0.046 0.044 0.041 0.042 0.046 0.045
(0.204) (0.213) (0.200) (0.201) (0.209) (0.205) (0.199) (0.201) (0.209) (0.206)
GCE, A or eq. 0.194 0.203 0.200 0.205 0.193 0.195 0.202 0.210 0.194 0.201
(0.395) (0.402) (0.400) (0.403) (0.395) (0.396) (0.402) (0.407) (0.396) (0.401)
GCSE A*–C or eq. 0.211 0.218 0.201 0.190 0.204 0.194 0.198 0.185 0.199 0.188
(0.408) (0.413) (0.401) (0.392) (0.403) (0.396) (0.399) (0.388) (0.399) (0.391)
Other qualifications 0.183 0.175 0.192 0.196 0.190 0.200 0.194 0.196 0.192 0.202
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(0.387) (0.380) (0.394) (0.397) (0.392) (0.400) (0.395) (0.397) (0.394) (0.402)
No qualifications 0.279 0.272 0.283 0.294 0.282 0.289 0.282 0.295 0.281 0.288
(0.448) (0.445) (0.450) (0.456) (0.450) (0.453) (0.450) (0.456) (0.449) (0.453)
Last job < 3 mts 0.101 0.110 0.101 0.114 0.105 0.119 0.100 0.112 0.104 0.117
(0.302) (0.312) (0.301) (0.318) (0.307) (0.324) (0.300) (0.316) (0.306) (0.321)
Last job 3—6 mts 0.118 0.120 0.118 0.118 0.122 0.124 0.115 0.117 0.120 0.123
(0.322) (0.325) (0.322) (0.323) (0.328) (0.329) (0.319) (0.321) (0.324) (0.329)
Last job 6—12 mts 0.180 0.157 0.154 0.160 0.159 0.156 0.153 0.159 0.158 0.153
(0.385) (0.364) (0.361) (0.366) (0.366) (0.363) (0.360) (0.365) (0.365) (0.360)
Last job 1—2 yrs 0.166 0.155 0.175 0.162 0.161 0.149 0.181 0.168 0.168 0.154
(0.372) (0.362) (0.380) (0.369) (0.368) (0.356) (0.385) (0.374) (0.374) (0.361)
Last job 2—3 yrs 0.077 0.088 0.098 0.097 0.086 0.088 0.103 0.103 0.091 0.094
(0.267) (0.283) (0.297) (0.296) (0.281) (0.283) (0.304) (0.303) (0.287) (0.292)
Last job 3—4 yrs 0.076 0.069 0.072 0.065 0.067 0.058 0.074 0.068 0.070 0.061
(0.265) (0.253) (0.258) (0.247) (0.250) (0.235) (0.262) (0.252) (0.255) (0.240)
Last job 4—5 yrs 0.045 0.058 0.044 0.048 0.045 0.051 0.047 0.050 0.049 0.055
(0.207) (0.234) (0.205) (0.214) (0.207) (0.220) (0.211) (0.217) (0.217) (0.228)
Last job > 5 yrs 0.143 0.160 0.137 0.153 0.152 0.171 0.128 0.143 0.140 0.159
(0.351) (0.367) (0.344) (0.360) (0.359) (0.376) (0.334) (0.350) (0.347) (0.366)
No job before 0.093 0.083 0.102 0.082 0.102 0.085 0.101 0.081 0.100 0.084
(0.291) (0.276) (0.303) (0.274) (0.303) (0.279) (0.301) (0.272) (0.300) (0.277)
North East 0.052 0.055 0.060 0.062 0.061 0.062 0.061 0.061 0.062 0.060
(0.221) (0.227) (0.238) (0.242) (0.240) (0.241) (0.239) (0.240) (0.242) (0.237)
North West 0.115 0.115 0.122 0.128 0.123 0.129 0.119 0.125 0.118 0.123
(0.319) (0.319) (0.327) (0.335) (0.328) (0.335) (0.323) (0.331) (0.323) (0.329)
York. & Humber. 0.091 0.086 0.095 0.092 0.098 0.095 0.091 0.090 0.092 0.092
(0.287) (0.280) (0.294) (0.290) (0.298) (0.293) (0.288) (0.286) (0.290) (0.288)
East Midlands 0.073 0.067 0.069 0.063 0.066 0.061 0.070 0.063 0.067 0.061
(0.260) (0.250) (0.253) (0.243) (0.248) (0.239) (0.255) (0.244) (0.250) (0.240)
West Midlands 0.111 0.100 0.097 0.096 0.096 0.095 0.096 0.095 0.096 0.093
(0.314) (0.300) (0.295) (0.294) (0.295) (0.293) (0.295) (0.293) (0.295) (0.291)
Eastern 0.069 0.079 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.077 0.079 0.079 0.080 0.082
(0.253) (0.270) (0.266) (0.265) (0.265) (0.266) (0.269) (0.270) (0.271) (0.274)
London 0.178 0.180 0.176 0.162 0.174 0.164 0.178 0.164 0.177 0.168
(0.383) (0.385) (0.381) (0.368) (0.379) (0.370) (0.382) (0.370) (0.382) (0.374)
South East 0.092 0.096 0.094 0.091 0.084 0.088 0.097 0.094 0.087 0.092
(0.289) (0.295) (0.292) (0.287) (0.278) (0.283) (0.297) (0.291) (0.282) (0.289)
South West 0.075 0.069 0.067 0.073 0.070 0.069 0.069 0.075 0.074 0.073
(0.264) (0.254) (0.250) (0.259) (0.256) (0.254) (0.253) (0.263) (0.263) (0.259)
Wales 0.048 0.053 0.049 0.052 0.052 0.054 0.047 0.050 0.051 0.050
(0.214) (0.225) (0.215) (0.222) (0.223) (0.225) (0.212) (0.217) (0.220) (0.218)
Scotland 0.097 0.099 0.096 0.105 0.098 0.107 0.094 0.104 0.095 0.107
(0.296) (0.299) (0.295) (0.307) (0.297) (0.310) (0.291) (0.306) (0.293) (0.309)
Nobs 2024 4970 7553 18393 4913 11865 6472 15638 3832 9110
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Table SM20: Attrition statistics. Difference-in-differences (DiD) in variable means between attriters
and non-attriters and between treated and untreated unemployed claimants are reported for 1996.
Differences in DiD between 1996 and control years are reported in following columns (DiDiD). ***
significant 0.1%, ** significant 1%, * significant 5%. Standard errors in parenthesis.
96 94-95-97-98 95-97-98 94-95-97 95-97
DiD se DiDiD se DiDiD se DiDiD se DiDiD se
s∗ -0.064 (0.111) 0.042 (0.148) 0.138 (0.156) -0.01 (0.15) 0.078 (0.163)
methPEC -0.001 (0.019) 0.016 (0.025) 0.019 (0.026) 0.005 (0.026) 0.002 (0.027)
Control variables
Female 0.023 (0.02) 0.006 (0.026) 0.001 (0.028) 0.006 (0.027) -0.001 (0.029)
Age -0.449 (0.551) -0.106 (0.74) 0.087 (0.783) 0.164 (0.751) 0.603 (0.81)
Married -0.024 (0.02) -0.006 (0.027) -0.008 (0.028) -0.003 (0.028) -0.003 (0.03)
Nr. kids 0—18 y -0.018 (0.052) 0.027 (0.069) 0.025 (0.072) 0.014 (0.07) 0.003 (0.075)
Degree or equiv. 0.028 (0.013) -0.012 (0.017) -0.01 (0.018) -0.015 (0.018) -0.014 (0.019)
Higher education 0.010 (0.01) 0.005 (0.012) -0.002 (0.013) 0.009 (0.012) 0.001 (0.014)
GCE, A or eq. -0.014 (0.018) 0.001 (0.024) 0.01 (0.025) -0.003 (0.024) 0.004 (0.026)
GCSE A*–C or eq. -0.012 (0.018) -0.004 (0.024) -0.009 (0.026) -0.007 (0.025) -0.015 (0.027)
Other qual. 0.012 (0.017) 0.014 (0.023) 0.026 (0.025) 0.015 (0.024) 0.029 (0.026)
No qual. -0.027 (0.02) -0.005 (0.027) -0.014 (0.028) 0.002 (0.027) -0.005 (0.029)
Last job < 3 m 0.012 (0.014) 0.027 (0.018) 0.019 (0.019) 0.022 (0.019) 0.01 (0.02)
Last job 3—6 m 0.001 (0.014) 0.011 (0.019) 0.005 (0.021) 0.015 (0.02) 0.011 (0.021)
Last job 6—12 m -0.025 (0.017) -0.018 (0.022) -0.004 (0.024) -0.025 (0.023) -0.011 (0.025)
Last job 1—2 y -0.003 (0.017) 0.023 (0.022) 0.017 (0.023) 0.032 (0.023) 0.03 (0.024)
Last job 2—3 y 0.012 (0.012) 0.000 (0.017) 0.001 (0.017) -0.002 (0.017) -0.001 (0.018)
Last job 3—4 y -0.020 (0.012) -0.024 (0.016) -0.009 (0.016) -0.027 (0.016) -0.009 (0.017)
Last job 4—5 y -0.003 (0.009) -0.011 (0.013) -0.013 (0.014) -0.011 (0.013) -0.013 (0.014)
Last job > 5 y 0.003 (0.016) -0.003 (0.021) -0.017 (0.023) 0.005 (0.021) -0.007 (0.023)
No job before 0.023 (0.013) -0.004 (0.018) 0.000 (0.019) -0.01 (0.018) -0.009 (0.019)
North East -0.012 (0.01) -0.001 (0.013) 0.001 (0.014) -0.001 (0.013) 0.002 (0.015)
North West -0.008 (0.014) -0.006 (0.019) -0.004 (0.02) -0.004 (0.019) 0.001 (0.021)
York. & Humber. 0.010 (0.013) 0.016 (0.017) 0.023 (0.018) 0.012 (0.017) 0.017 (0.019)
East Midlands -0.006 (0.012) -0.006 (0.015) -0.008 (0.016) -0.008 (0.016) -0.012 (0.017)
West Midlands 0.007 (0.014) 0.017 (0.018) 0.012 (0.019) 0.021 (0.018) 0.017 (0.02)
Eastern -0.001 (0.011) -0.012 (0.015) -0.01 (0.016) -0.013 (0.016) -0.012 (0.017)
London -0.008 (0.018) -0.005 (0.024) -0.015 (0.025) 0.004 (0.024) -0.003 (0.026)
South East 0.009 (0.013) 0.008 (0.017) 0.012 (0.018) 0.001 (0.018) 0.000 (0.019)
South West 0.014 (0.012) 0.001 (0.016) -0.005 (0.017) -0.002 (0.016) -0.011 (0.017)
Wales -0.004 (0.01) 0.004 (0.013) 0.007 (0.014) 0.006 (0.013) 0.01 (0.014)
Scotland -0.002 (0.013) -0.018 (0.018) -0.012 (0.019) -0.017 (0.018) -0.01 (0.019)
Nobs 6994 25946 16778 22110 12942
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